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# USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1746

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### ARMED FORCES

## GENERAL YEPISHEV ON IMPROVEMENTS IN PARTY WORK

PM260825 Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 82 (signed to press 20 Sep 82) pp 8-19

[Article by Army General A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate: "To Improve the Leadership of Party Organizations"]

[Text] The entire life of our party, the Soviet people and their armed forces is being influenced by the 26th CPSU Congress' historic decisions. The successes in communist building achieved by Soviet working people in the implementation of the 11th 5-Year Plan targets provide convincing evidence of the vitality and galvanizing force the congress' ideas and the colossal scale and depth of the transforming activity of our party—the Soviet people's truly revolutionary vanguard. A new surge of creative forces has been aroused among Soviet people by the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) Plenum decisions. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report and the USSR food program adopted at the plenum are vivid confirmation of the party's constant concern to improve the Soviet people's prosperity and strengthen our country's economic and defense might.

Wholly approving the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy and the vast plans of communist building, the motherland's defenders see their task in vigilantly guarding our people's creative labor, reliably protecting socialism's gains in conjunction with the socialist community countries' armies and being ever ready to repulse all aggressors. In the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation the indestructible cohesion of army and navy servicemen-representatives of all nations and ethnic groups in our country--around the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the outstanding party and state figure of the present day and continuer of the great Leninist cause, and their resolve to fulfill their patriotic and internationalist duty with honor are being displayed with new force.

The 26th CPSU Congress, as is well known, made a detailed analysis of the party's development and confirmed the conclusion that in the period of mature socialism its role in society's life is growing. This is an objective law-governed process. But of course, this process cannot be represented as spontaneous or automatic. "...The role of society's leading force," the 26th CPSU Congress noted, "does not come about easily or of its own accord. This role is earned or won in the

course of constant, ceaseless struggle for working people's interests." The further increase in the Communist Party's leading role is directly linked to the growth of primary party organizations' combat capability. They are the party's basis and are in the front line of the struggle to implement its policy. Thanks to their activity the party's ideas and decisions penetrate Soviet people's awareness deeply and are translated into the language of concrete deeds. The CPSU Central Committee report to the 26th Congress stressed with new force the paramount role of primary party organizations in resolving the great and diverse tasks of communist building.

The primary party organizations of the Soviet Armed Forces are a combat detachment of the CPSU. They operate at the very heart of servicemen at large, are the political nucleus of military collectives and by their work actively promote the coordination of party policy in the sphere of strengthening the country's defense capability with personnel's daily military labor. Their entire activity is geared toward fulfilling the Communist Party's demands to maintain high political vigilance and constant combat readiness and is built in indissoluble conjunction with the fulfillment of the specific tasks set for troops and fleets.

The CPSU Central Committee takes constant care to enhance the role of army and navy party organizations and to strengthen them ideologically and organizationally. New confirmation of this was provided by the Sixth All-Army Conference of primary party organization secretaries. The CPSU Central Committee's greetings to participants in the All-Army Conference, the instructions contained in the greetings and the tasks set in the report of marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, have become a combat program of activity for all military councils, commanders, political organs and party organizations in the further implementation of the 26th party congress' decisions, in improving party political work and in raising the combat readiness of troops and naval forces. The conference's comprehensive analysis of party organizations' activity, creative exchange of experience of training and education, principled assessment of shortcomings and recommendations set out in the conference resolution are of great significance for the practical work of military cadres, political organs and party organizations. This was the conclusion reached in particular by army and navy communists when discussing the All-Army Conference's results at meetings of the party aktivs of divisions, military academic institutions and primary party organizations. At present measures are being taken to implement the conference recommendations and communists' proposals aimed at intensifying party influence on all aspects of the life and activity of unit and ship personnel.

The CPSU Central Committee greetings to the participants in the Sixth All-Army Conference of primary party organization secretaries stressed that the further raising of party organizations' activeness and militancy, principled-mindedness and initiative in resolving the tasks of maintaining high vigilance and combat readiness is of special significance at present. The fulfillment of this very important task arising from the 26th CPSU Congress guidelines greatly depends on the activity of political organs entrusted by the Central Committee with the leadership of party work within the armed forces.

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the political directorates of the branches of the armed forces and other political organs pay constant attention to questions of enhancing the role of primary party organizations as the political nucleus of military collectives and the center of daily ideological education activity, increasing their influence on the resolution of tasks relating to the personnel's combat readiness, training and education and strengthening military discipline.

After the 26th CPSU Congress noticeably more attention was paid by political organs to the leadership of primary party organizations and to studying their work experience. Of great significance here is the implementation of the conclusions and recommendations contained in a number of CPSU Central Committee resolutions and in particular the CPSU Central Committee resolution of 21 January 1967 "On Measures To Improve Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," the Central Committee resolution "On the Zlatoust CPSU Gorkom's Leadership of Enterprise Primary Party Organizations" as well as the fulfillment of the requirements of the regulations on political organs and the instruction to CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy.

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate recently examined important questions of the leadership of primary party organizations in the Leningrad, Belorussia, Moscow and Urals military districts, the Pacific Fleet and airborne and railroad troops. Many political directorates and political organs have begun to lead primary party organizations more skillfully and in so doing to take better account of the multi-level nature of their structure, to analyze intraparty life in greater depth and to make more frequent examinations of topical questions of party work with commanders and different categories of political personnel.

The process of the organizational-political and structural strengthening of party organizations is continuing. The network of party organizations and party groups within subunits is being developed. The placement of communists within combat subunits and organs of administration and on combat duty is being improved.

Party organizations are paying greater attention to the provision of political information to servicemen and to educating them in a spirit of high vigilance and combat readiness, and all communists are being enlisted more actively in this work. Political organs and party organizations have begun to make a more perceptible effort to analyze ideological, political and educational work in greater depth, to equip military cadres with Lenin's ideological legacy and the 26th CPSU Congress' wealth of theoretical ideas and to increase their responsibility for participation in the education of subordinates.

A particularly great responsibility for the leadership of party organizations rests on the political sections of divisions. Most of them carry out this function skillfully and lead party organizations while taking into account changes in the organization and technical equipping of troops, methods of armed struggle and the qualitative composition of personnel. This enables them to grasp in depth the state of affairs at grassroots level and, on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the content, forms and methods of party work, to formulate valid recommendations and to engage more objectively in organizational activity.

This style is typical of, for example, the political section of the division led by Lt Col N. Volkov. This political section keeps all party organizations in its purview, knows their lives well, shows great concern for secretary cadres, their [word indistinct] training and instruction and the enhancement of the role of unit party committees and party bureaus as organs of collective leadership and gives them effective assistance in improving party work methods. Each month the political section plans the study at two or three party organizations of specific questions connected with improving the activeness and initiative of party committees and the responsibility of communists for the high-quality fulfillment of combat readiness tasks and combat and political training plans, the strengthening of military discipline and the fulfullment of socialist pledges. Officers of the political section make systematic visits to exercises and hold regular and detailed talks with commanders, political workers, party organization secretaries, communists and nonparty servicemen. This helps them to make an in-depth study of the true state of affairs, to investigate the causes of shortcomings and to take expeditious on-the-spot measures. The results of the work of this political sections's officers among party organizations is under discussion at party committee and party bureau sessions, party meetings, aktiv conferences and gatherings of deputy commanders of political units.

The political section focuses party organizations' main efforts on ensuring communists' vanguard role and activeness in the struggle to successfully master combat equipment, reduce the time it takes to bring units to combat readiness and improve military technical propaganda and rationalization and invention work. At tactical, command headquarters and other exercises the political section teaches the party aktiv, in accordance with the specific situation, how to carry out party work, analyze it and carry things through to their conclusion. Acting in close coordination with the commander, it purposively directs the initiative of communists and the personnel as a whole toward improving combat readiness and the quality of combat training and strengthening discipline. The formation is rightly regarded as one of the leading formations in the southern group of forces.

One could cite many similar examples of political organs' desire to improve the style and methods of leadership of primary party organizations, and as a result of this the militancy of primary party organizations is steadily growing. They are actively influencing the solution of specific tasks of combat and mobilization readiness, combat duty and ground, air and sea training. During maneuvers and exercises, flights and long-distance voyages experience of party work in conditions approaching those of real combat is enriched. Party organizations are actively participating in the organization of socialist competition for a fitting greeting to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. They display concern to ensure that communists set an example and perform a vanguard role in combat training and service. Communists are uniting and leading the personnel toward the attainment of new targets in the combat refinement of subunits, units and ships.

At the same time a number of primary party organizations are still failing to fully exploit organizational and political opportunities for improving the effectiveness of party influence on the high-quality solution of tasks of combat readiness and combat training. Some of them often overlook violations of the roles of combat duty and military discipline and shortcomings in the mastering of equipment and armaments. These omissions throw into bold relief defects in the leadership of party organizations on the part of political organs. In some cases reorganization in the light of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of primary party organization secretaries is too slow. In the leadership of party organizations some political organs sometimes fail to take specific factors and the character of the tasks they are solving into consideration. Sometimes there is insufficient emphasis on attention to party work organization when carrying out the most complex tasks of combat readiness, training, education and strengthening of military discipline.

One is scarcely likely to come across party organization which has not examined questions relating to combat readiness and combat training. But it is not just a matter of raising questions; party organizations must be helped to determine their own, distinctive methods of political approach to the solution of various tasks and to elaborate and implement effective measures of party influence on the elimination of defects. This is sometimes lacking in the leadership of party organizations. Or take such an important area of combat training as commander training of officers. Demands on their professional training have increased considerably. Officers make up the vast majority of many party organizations. However, some political organs are extremely diffident about getting involved in this important sphere and are making a poor job of getting party organizations to improve the quality of commander training.

It would be useful if the potential of socialist competition were much more fully exploited. Often its effectiveness is diminished because political organs and party organizations put most of their effort into its first two stages—adoption of pledges and summing up of results. This means that they are basically ignoring the most important part—the actual process of competition, the uncovering and propagation of things new and advanced. In some cases there is a failure to adopt an exacting attitude toward those who have not kept their word and have not fulfilled pledges. Although it is undoubtedly the party organizations, ably led by political organs, which must set the right tone in the organization of competition and in generating an atmosphere of creative quest and critical interpretation of the results which have been achieved.

To develop the activeness and militancy of army and navy party organizations means above all to increase their role in the consistent implementation of party policy in the armed forces and ensure that every party organization, bureau and party committee has a profound knowledge of the state of affairs in very important areas of combat readiness and combat training of personnel, promptly raises and resolves urgent questions and ensures that communists play the leading role in military collectives.

It is perfectly clear that activeness is closely connected with party organizations' initiative and their ability to constantly see their role and place in the solution of all-party tasks, new elements in the training of forces and

fleets and the desire to improve forms and methods of ideological, political and organizational influence and support and develop the personnel's creativity. That is why political organs are called upon to strive persistently to ensure that an atmosphere of healthy dissatisfaction with what has been achieved and the quest for the new are maintained in every party organization.

Scope for displaying vigor and initiative in the activity of party organizations is wide and varied. Especially in the sphere of ideological and political education work. A fruitful process of enrichment of its content and improvement of its results is taking place under the influence of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and instructions and recommendations of the party Central Committee. In fulfilling the demands of the CPSU Central Committee resolutions "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Education Work" and "On the Further Improvement of Party Training in the Light of the 26th CPSU Congress decisions," political organs are doing a great deal to ensure that party organizations are constantly concerned about the ideological tempering of communists and about developing in personnel profound ideological conviction, loyalty to improve duty and constant readiness to defend the motherland and the historic gains of socialism.

It is a general rule now that, on the initiative of party committees and bureaus, planned Marxist-Leninist training sessions are supplemented by theoretical conferences, conversations and consultations on topical problems of CPSU theory and policy and there is a widespread practice of person-to-person conversations with communists on the details of the ideological education work they are carrying out and of hearing reports by party members and candidate members on the broadening of their ideological outlook and personal participation in the political education of troops.

At the same time, only the first steps have been taken in the implementation of 26th CPSU Congress' instructions on the reorganization of many sectors and spheres of ideological work by political organs and party organizations.

"In party enlightenment," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted, "the main question is, perhaps, that of results. What do we want to achieve? We want party policy to merge with the activity of the masses and we want the party enlightenment system to teach people, as V. I. Lenin put it, 'to act in the way that communism actually demands.' In other words, it is a matter of achieving real unity of party ideological and theoretical, political education, organizational and economic work..."

Political organs and party organizations have a great deal of work to do to improve the results of party training and overcome existing shortcomings and omissions in it, with prime reference to the Marxist-Leninist training of communist officers. Final checks show that in some units Marxist-Leninist training is having insufficient influence on installing lofty political and moral qualities in communists. Instances of lack of concern for the replenishment

of political knowledge do not always receive a sharp party assessment. Analyses of the degree of influence of political training on party members and candidate members' service are still poor. One must ensure that specific demands are actually made on every communist in terms of the fulfillment of one of the demands of the party rules—constantly raising one's ideological standard.

As is known, communists are operating in all spheres of political and military education. Many of them lead groups of political classes and are members of agitation and propaganda collectives and groups and club, library and Lenin room councils. It is an important duty of political organs and party organizations to ensure that they all carry out these very crucial assignments.

The 26th CPSU Congress demands heightened responsibility on the part of communists for all agitation and propaganda measures and unity of word and deed. But not all political organs workers and party organizations are striving to get to grips with the qualitative aspect of lectures, conversations, reports, political briefings and classes. The chief emphasis is sometimes placed on the quantitative aspect and not on the ideological content of the measures and their effectiveness. Nor can one tolerate manifestations of verbiage in propaganda, an inadequate link with life and a desire to avoid acute and worrying problems. Instances of formalism cannot be tolerated in ideological education and propaganda work. They must be given a strict party assessment.

There is a very urgent need to switch the efforts of the ideological aktiv directly to the subunits. This will go a long way toward increasing the effectiveness of political education work. This is the only way to ensure the fullest implementation of the CPSU Central Committee's demand on making every party organization a center of daily ideological education activity. This requires a principled assessment of communists' work in all areas of political training, agitation work and propaganda so that none of them works to no effect, the skillful coordination of the ideological aktiv's educational efforts and, most important of all, persistent efforts to ensure that every communist, wherever he be, is a genuine ideological warrior of the party. The more closely political organs analyze and direct party organizations' ideological life the more active they will be in ideological education work.

Principle-mindedness on the part of party organizations was a demand put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress as being inseparably linked with activeness and initiative. For all political organs this means ensuring that primary party organizations objectively and self-critically assess the state of affairs from general state and party positions, boldly uncover shortcomings and join the commander and his deputy for political affairs in seeking ways of eliminating them, ensuring the communists' vanguard role and generating an atmosphere of great exactingness in the subunit, unit or ship party collective.

It must be said that many political organs have begun to do more to ensure that party organizations make a correct assessment of the activity of each party member and candidate member and his personal contribution to improving combat readiness, developing socialist competition for free expression of opinions, proposals and observations of a critical nature.

However, this kind of atmosphere has not been created in all party organizations. To some extent this is due to the fact that some political organs are trying to resolve set tasks without displaying concern for increasing primary party organizations' role in this. Staff in a number of political departments rarely visit them, do not attend party committee and bureau sessions and pay little attention to party aktiv training. Therefore, one encounters party organizations which tolerate shortcomings. Some political organs are not setting an example of high principle-mindedness. They permit cases of tolerance toward instances of concealment of negative phenomena, embellishment of the state of affairs and nonfulfillment of socialist pledges.

Lack of principle when assessing the state of military discipline is fraught with particularly serious consequences. There have occasionally been cases where political organs and party organizations have adopted a conciliatory attitude toward instances of failure to perform tasks, concealment of incidents and violations and antipedagogic [antipedagogicheskiy] methods of working with people. Sometimes a sharp, principled assessment is not forthcoming in cases where communists display a passive attitude toward service, abuse their positions and violate discipline and the norms of communist morality.

Political organs have the important practical task to increase the responsibility and personal contribution of every party member and candidate member to strengthening and increasing the role of party committees, party bureaus and party organization secretaries in the struggle for quality and efficiency in the political, military, moral and legal education of servicemen and work with individuals and in maintaining a healthy moral climate in military collectives.

It is necessary to ensure that every party committee, party bureau and party organization secretary gets closer to people, knows their feelings, needs and requirements and displays initiative in placing urgent questions before the commanders and political organs to ensure their prompt solution. Political organs must be more principled in their assessment of every instance of disregard for and callousness toward people and ensure the prompt elimination of shortcomings in material and consumer supplies and cultural services for the personnel.

Political organs must ensure that a spirit of intolerance of shortcomings is established in all party organizations and that party members and candidate members struggle resolutely against soft treatment and oversimplification in the training and education of personnel, against anything that might in any way adversely affect the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships. Communists have no right under any circumstances to be mere onlookers. This is precisely the approach needed in party organizations. Only then will they be able to perform the role of the leading political force of military collectives.

The militancy of primary party organizations and their organizational and political strengthening are bound up with the problem of party membership. The replenishment of party ranks and the education of young communists are a very important area of

activity for all primary party organizations and party commissions and all political departments. Practice shows that the responsibility of political organs and party organizations for the quality of party recruits has markedly increased. Stricter checks are being carried out on the political, work and moral qualities of people joining the party, the people recommending them are facing greater demands and better use is being made of the candidate member period.

However, the shortcomings in this important matter noted by the party's Central Committee in the well-known resolution on Kirghizia's party organizations have still not been fully eliminated. Some political organs and party commissions do not always deeply analyze the state of work in this sector, the quality of party recruits and slips which are allowed to occur in selection for the party; at times there is no keen, principled assessment of instances of a hasty, condescending approach in examining the political and practical qualities of entrants and even cases of over-hasty admission to the party. Not all political organs and party organizations associate the replenishing of the party's ranks with the placing of communists and the strengthening of party influence in decisive sectors and among the leading categories of servicemen. It is important to continue to devote constant attention to ensuring a controlling influence by political organs and party organizations on the growth of party ranks and the quality of those admitted to the party and to their passage through the candidate stage.

A necessary condition of the further development of initiative, activeness and a principled approach on the part of party organizations is concern among political organs for the content of their internal life and the consistent observance of intraparty democracy and party discipline. This makes it possible to maintain a favorable atmosphere for harmonious, fruitful work in military collectives. The effective nature of intraparty democracy is being manifested particularly clearly during the current report and election campaign, which is summing up the first results of party organizations, work in fulfilling the 26th CPSU Congress decisions and the recommendations of the Sixth All-Party Conference of primary party organization secretaries. The meetings are examining various aspects of party work with great exactingness, making searching evaluations of what has been achieved and of the activity of elected leadership organs and putting forward many proposals and criticisms aimed at improving matters.

The party meeting is a place, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in the CPSU Central Committee report to the 26th Party Congress, where all vital issues must be discussed seriously and in depth. A process of enhancing the role of party meetings as schools for educating communists is underway in army and navy party organizations. Leadership personnel and workers in political organs now take part increasingly frequently in the work of party meetings, and attentiveness toward the implementation of the proposals and criticisms made is being stepped up. At the same time the established practice of holding party meetings needs to be improved. The interests of the cause also require a further improvement in their ideological standard and effectiveness and the authoritativeness of the decisions adopted.

Increasing the militancy of party organizations means, first and foremost, saturating their life with ideological commitment. Political organs are called upon to display constant concern to ensure that all measures carried out by a party organization are prepared to a high ideological and organizational standard and that each of them influences the spiritual world of CPSU members and candidate members and cultivates the necessary political, practical and moral qualities in communists. In this connection the practice of holding individual conversations with communists, hearing their reports and accounts of the fulfillment of duties rules and educating them on party assignments requires more attentive study. Particular attention must be devoted to communists' work in trade union and Komsomol organizations and people's control organs.

In the interests of strengthening the party's ranks it is important to adopt a highly exacting approach to the evaluation of communists' observance of duties under the rules and to be implacable toward violations of the CPSU rules and the norms of communist morality. At the same time political organs' attention must be drawn to the fact that the party organizations of many units and ships only react to those misdemeanors which require extreme administrative and party measures. Such educational measures as comradely criticism or the party reprimand, warning or instruction, for which provision is made in the CPSU rules, are used extremely rarely.

Political organs must establish more firmly in party organizations the system of analyzing the personal example set by communists and their sociopolitical activeness and must step up preventive work to forestall violations of discipline. Members of party commissions attached to political organs should be more actively involved in verifying the fulfillment of the CPSU rules by party members and candidate members and their observance of party, state and military discipline.

The standard of intraparty life depends largely on political organs' work with the elected party aktiv. The aktiv includes a significant proportion of army and navy communists. This is a great force. It is important to strive to ensure that everyone elected to a leading party organ has a specific range of duties, is responsible for them and plays the most active part in the work of the party, of the party committee or bureau. Political organs should constantly keep the aktiv up to date on party policy, the tasks of strengthening the country's defense and questions of military building, consult with activists more often and make fuller use of their energy, knowledge and experience in organizing work among the masses.

The central figure in the party aktiv is the party organization secretary. It should be stressed that on the whole political organs devote constant attention to the selection, training and education of secretaries. The quality of party committee and party bureau secretaries has improved perceptibly recently. More than 60 percent of them now have higher education. The practice of hearing reports from party committee and bureau secretaries in political organs and the system of meetings and seminars with them in districts, groups of forces and fleets have become established.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, describing the party worker, noted that the real party leader is characterized to the highest degree by a thorough knowledge of life and of people's feelings and the ability to listen to his comrades' opinions. The real party leader is characterized by his lack of indifference, his feeling for what is new, his constant desire to do better and do more today than yesterday. Army and navy party leaders strive to meet precisely these demands.

At the same time many new comrades join the leadership of party organizations every year. Last year alone one-third of the secretaries were new. Account must also be taken of the fact that most primary party organization secretaries are unreleased workers. This makes it incumbent on political organs to teach them more purposefully and in a more concrete way, to extend their ideological and political outlook, to deepen their knowledge of questions of party building, to enrich them with the experience, means and methods of activity of party committees and bureaus and to do everything possible to enhance the authority of party organization secretaries.

The task set by the 26th CPSU Congress of increasing the activeness, initiative and principled approach of primary party organizations requires a higher standard of leadership of their activity on the part of political organs. The ability to concentrate party organizations' efforts above all on the main sectors of combat readiness and the training and education of personnel, the constant study and dissemination of experience of party work, flexible instruction of the aktiv and the strengthening and development of the party network in subunits must be the most important criteria in assessing any political organ.

The political section of a formation or individual unit must be the direct leader and organizer of party work. But some of them, instead of systematically analyzing the work of each primary party organization and giving it practical help, waste their main efforts on numerous, often superficial checks on the general state of affairs and note the same shortcomings again and again in combat training, political education work and military discipline, without seeking to enhance the organizing role of party committees and bureaus of units and ships on their mastery of the methods of the political approach to resolving the prescribed tasks.

This situation was encountered, in particular, in the formation of the Carpathian Military District where Col V. Shevchenko is chief of the political section. Workers from this political section visited units but studied intraparty life only poorly, did not discern certain negative phenomena in time and failed to urge communists to eliminate shortcomings in the training process and the education and daily life of personnel.

Thus in the regiment where Lt Col V. Lisin is the party committee secretary the network of party organizations in subunits was curtailed, their ability to set an example in combat training and service was reduced as a result of a low level of exactingness toward communists and many adopted party decisions remained

unfulfilled. The regiment was among the laggards as regards discipline. But this did not alarm the political section. For a long time none of its workers even attended party meetings or party committee sessions there.

The correct conclusions must be drawn from such shortcomings. Political directorates should draw the attention of all political sections to the activity of the party organizations of units and ships, particularly those which are laggards in combat training and discipline, study the atmosphere in those party collectives more profoundly and comprehensively examine the work style of party committees in political organs, bearing in mind that the main thing is to help them rectify matters.

Well-organized party information work is an effective tool of leadership. Much has recently been done to improve it and to extend publicity in the work of political organs and party organizations. But much must still be done to increase the immediacy and objectivity of party information work, particularly the upward flow of information from the primary party organization to the political section. The system of analyzing information about the activity of party committees and bureaus, the personal example set by communists and their sociopolitical activeness has not yet been thought through everywhere. The quality of a number of political organs' information documents also remains low. Insufficient use is made of people's letters and proposals as a channel of information.

It is necessary to be more demanding as regards the formulation and authenticity of party information, to persistently improve both the downward and the upward flow of information, to teach commanders, political workers and the party aktiv the ability to generalize and analyze information, to draw the correct conclusions from it and to cultivate in them a taste for this work.

A necessary condition of successful leadership of primary party organizations is monitoring and verification of the execution of decisions. Since the adoption of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Further Improving Monitoring and Verification of Execution of Decisions in the Light of the 26th CPSU Congress Decisions," attention toward this most important sector of work has increased in the main. At the same time verification of the execution of decisions remains a weak link in the activity of a number of political directorates and political sections. This work lacks flexibility, a planned approach and the organic combination of monitoring with practical work in fulfilling party decisions. A number of political organs do poor work in checking the execution of their own recommendations and instructions and the resolutions of party aktiv meetings. Monitoring is not infrequently complicated because political organs' recommendations to primary party organizations and resolutions adopted in party organizations are sometimes of a general, declarative nature. Verification without organizing matters and eliminating the shortcomings revealed on the spot gives rise, as a rule, to a stream of new directives and instructions. "...The art of leadership," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is not to engender and lavish new directives on every pretext. After adopting a decision it is necessary to ensure its strict fulfillment on schedule."

The improvement of monitoring and verification of the execution of decisions is helped to a considerable degree by the development of criticism and self-criticism in political organs and party organizations. The essence of it, as is known, consists in all aspects of the activities of party organizations and communists receiving an objective assessment so that existing shortcomings are subjected to thorough analysis with the aim of eliminating them and not permitting an indulgent attitude toward those who have allowed them, and so that any incidence of an incorrect reaction to criticism causes a sharp and prompt response from the party organs. Party organs must first of all set an example themselves in the development of businesslike principled criticism and self-criticism, teach this to the lower party levels and constantly concern themselves with the effectiveness of communists' critical statements.

The enhancement of primary party organizations' activity is inextricably linked with the selection, placement and education of cadres. Political organs and party organisations carry out considerable multifaceted work in this area. They have begun to devote more attention to equipping leaders, especially young ones, with management skills and methods for political and military education and strengthening discipline. However, analysis of cases of incorrect conduct by individual communist leaders shows that in their selection and promotion of cadres of any rank political organs and party organizations do not take full account of the political, professional and moral qualities of the people. In some places a standardized, formal approach to the drawing up of party references can be observed. When promoting comrades to leadership posts the opinion formed of them in party collectives is not always taken into account.

Party organizations carry out their activity in close contact with commanders and deputy commanders for political affairs. On the whole this work is carried out in a harmonious and concerted manner. However, not all commanders really rely on party organizations and direct their activity in a skillful way.

Reliance on the party organization means developing its activeness and initiative, assisting in the implementation of all measures, constantly consulting with communists and the secretaries and members of party committees and bureaus, taking communists' suggestions into account in your work, reacting in a businesslike way to critical observations, taking measures to eliminate shortcomings and serving as a model in the execution of party assignments.

Directing a party organization's activity means first of all personally participating in its work, informing the communists promptly about the tasks ahead, the ways of solving them and the positive aspects and shortcomings in the combat and political training and in discipline, and—together with the deputy commander for political affairs and the secretaries of the party committees and party bureaus—striving for purposefulness in the party organization's work and a close link between this work and the life of the subunits, concerning yourself to ensure the exemplary nature of communists and creating conditions where their activeness and initiative can be shown.

Political organs must concern themselves more with equipping commanders with the skill to exploit to the full the party organization's collective potential in the interests of the matter at hand and at the same time foster in them responsibility for the fulfillment of their own party duties.

The political directorates of districts, groups of forces and fleets are called upon to resolve important tasks. Their direct duty is to know thoroughly the standard of activity of each political section in its leadership of party organizations, to generalize and introduce advanced experience and to increase cadres' responsibility for the state of party work. Obviously, more attention must be devoted to analyzing the work practice of party organizations of staffs, directorates, military commissariats and military educational establishments and also of battalion and company party organizations. Party organizations' leadership of financially autonomous enterprises, organizations and construction projects, whose administration's activity they have been given the right of monitoring, needs further improvement.

The political directorates of the branches of the armed forces should study more deeply the methodology of the work of subordinate political organs and the effectiveness of their leadership of primary party organizations. It is essential to improve the training of the political organs' apparatus, examine these questions more concretely at gatherings of political organ chiefs and persistently improve their level of occupational training.

The party organizational work sections and departments of political organs play a large part in resolving these tasks. They are, as it were, at the center of the multifaceted organizational activity and along with other sections and departments are obliged to systematically enrich the political sections with topical information, considered recommendations and experience of party work. The inspectors and instructors of these sections and departments must provide clear assistance to the political sections of divisions and to party committees and bureaus in the establishment of a businesslike, creative party style, energetic, competent party leadership and lively organizational work on the spot. It goes without saying that in order to achieve this the inspectors and instructors must themselves have a good command of party work methods and an in-depth knowledge of the life of primary organizations.

In the matter of improving leadership of primary party organizations it is important to exploit general party experience more fully, maintain permanent close contacts with local party organs, acquaint yourself with the forms and methods of their work and apply it creatively in your own activity.

The unswerving implementation of the 26th CPSU Congress' directives and the recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference on primary party organization secretaries will make it possible to raise still higher the cohesion of army and navy communists and their activeness in resolving the tasks that the party and government set the Soviet Armed Forces.

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### ARMED FORCES

## INTERNATIONAL INDOCTRINATION IN TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 82 (signed to press 20 Sep 82) pp 32-37

[Article by Maj Gen Ye. Aunapu, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "In a Spirit of Patriotism and Internationalism"]

[Text] It was scarcely light in the east when the men from the field water supply company under the command of Sr Lt A. Pinchuk began to prepare the necessary tools and equipment. The drilling crew under the command of Pvt N. Votchel' was securing the mast while the subordinates of Jr Sgt A. Limonov were preparing the pump and the drilling mud. Everyone was working quickly because the desert was thirsty for water, in the military tent compound in the Afghan village excited by the news about the starting drilling.

They were waiting for water. And when it appeared, a silver geyser shooting into the sky, there was no end to the joy. For many decades the Afghan peasantry had dreamt of this day. Now the waterless valley had received its first artesian well due to the Soviet soldiers.

Recently the newspaper FRUNZEVETS of our Turkestan Military District described this fact of selfless aid to the fraternal Afghan people. What is noteworthy in it? First of all that the personnel of the field water supply company, like the other Soviet military, saw in their difficult labor not only a sacred international obligation, but also a high honor.

Even in 1918, V. I. Lenin, in a speech at a meeting of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment, defined this trait as an innovative one. He said: "To us has befallen the great honor of defending sacred ideas with weapons in hand...in deed to carry out the international fraternity of peoples."

The Turkestan soldiers are loyal to Lenin's legacy. Those of them who are part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan are conscientiously carrying out their international duty and are helping the working people defend the victories of the revolution and build a new, happy life. In meeting with them and seeing them in action, one involuntarily recalls the words of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said from the rostrum of the 26th Party Congress: "Each

time when the interests of national security and the defense of peace require this, when it is essential to aid the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier presents himself to the world as a selfless and courageous patriot, an internationalist ready to overcome any difficulties.

Our ideological opponents have recently significantly strengthened their subversive activities. They are directing this against the unity of the socialist nations and the multinational Soviet nation, they are endeavoring to undermine the friendship of peoples and sow mistrust and national hostility between them. But in vain. The friendship and solidarity of the nations and nationalities in the motherland of October have been tested out over the years and they have grown stronger. The army is also strong in this friendship. Due to the organizing and leading role of the party and to its wise nationality policy, our Worker-Peasant Red Army even during the first years of its existence became a true school of patriotism and internationalism. During the period of the Civil War it embodied the military and political alliance which had formed between the republics and after its end became the symbol of the joint struggle with the people to build socialism and securely defend the victories of Great October.

This was particularly apparent in Central Asia where the troops of the Turkestan Front had to be concerned simultaneously with military and political training and conduct combat operations against the Basmach bands up until 1931. The Red Armymen and commanders lived for the same aspirations of the workers who were building a new life and they in turn showed an ardent interest in the affairs of our military district. There was no major political campaign which did not involve the Turkestan troops. There was not a single significant event in the life of the troops which was overlooked by the leaders of the communist parties and governments of the Central Asian republics, the local party and soviet bodies and public organizations. The commanders, political workers and troops helped in eliminating illiteracy and in building national economic projects, including canals, and they organized clubs. Once the news traveled quickly through all of Turkestan that the Red Armymen Ignatiy Gorbunov, Nikolay Pavlichenko and Ivan Chernenko invented an important part for a cotton harvester. During those joyous days, the okrug newspaper wrote: "Capitalist America has been thinking for 70 years about this. Hundreds of inventors have been wracking their brains over the clever times which would delicately remove the cotton from the boll. The Red Armymen have been the winners. The author of the invention is the Red Army. The party and Soviet power have indoctrinated the new man who is concerned for the cause of all the people."

In a word, the history of our Turkestan Military District, the combat and labor chronicle of the Central Asian republics provide rich opportunities for the patriotic and international indoctrination of today's defenders of the motherland's southern frontiers. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR" emphasizes that a strengthening of the patriotic and international indoctrination of the youth is achieved through many ways. Primarily by a profound explanation of the Leninist nationality policy of the CPSU, by the strengthening of the friendship and fraternity of peoples and by broadly propagandizing the revolutionary, military and labor traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and the heroic feats of the USSR Armed Forces. For carrying out the party's demands, the military council of our district, the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations have outlined and are implementing measures making it possible for the soldiers of the 1980's to more profoundly sense and understand the great victories and advantages

of socialism as well as the feats of the elder generations and their contemporaries. In the political indoctrination, extensive use is made of the unified political days, the giving of lectures and reports and speeches by the participants of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars and the heroes of the first five-year plans. Recently in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, our district held an agitation flight. As a member of the honorary crew which visited the military garrisons and compounds, the plants and factories, the towns and villages of the Central Asian republics was the veteran of the Uzbek Civil Air Fleet Administration, the former military pilot and writer, the Hero of the Soviet Union Boris Yermilovich Tikhomolov. His comments evoked great interest among the listeners.

The unbreakable friendship of the peoples from the different nationalities, the unity of the Soviet people and army, the ardent patriotism and internationalism were unprecedentedly apparent during the years of the Great Patriotic War. For this reason, the use of letters by war participants and the rear workers which were published in the front newspaper provides a great effect in the indoctrination of the Turkestan soldiers in the military and labor traditions as well as in the examples of courage and self-sacrifice by the Soviet people.

Here are several lines from a letter written by the Uzbek workers to the front: "Sons, husbands and brothers! Deal the enemy a fierce rebuff, stop the Nazis, throw back and rout the bloody butchers. Remember! Hitler is a vowed enemy not only of the European...but all the peoples of the East.... Your street begins in Belorussia and the house of the Ukrainian is in your village."

And here is what the front wrote: "Fighting in the Galician Steppes, not for a single moment do we forget the valley which became the mother of our division, the fertile Fergana. The concern and enthusiasm of the Uzbek people have inspired us to feats which have brought us military glory.... A blood tie links us with the Uzbek people.... We are defending Tashkent at Kursk and on the Dnepr, and we are fighting for the well-being and happiness of Central Asia on the Galician Steppes."

Several times I have been present at measures when similar ardent lines were read from letters and have seen at such solemn moments the eyes of the Turkestan soldiers which literally reflected the flames of the last war and have heard their solemn assurances that they would not allow a new world conflagration!

A very important area in the work relating to the patriotic and international indoctrination of the men is the demand raised in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 60th anniversary of the USSR of profoundly disclosing the nature and patricular features of the formation and development of the new historical community of people, the Soviet people, the ways for further strengthening the union of the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia, the merging of the country's nations and nationalities and the forming of a classless society. Our district, like all the Armed Forces, represents the entire national diversity of the country. The troop collectives mirror the relationships which have formed between the nations and nationalities of a developed socialist society. The friendship, solidarity and mutual aid of the men from the various nationalities comprise the basis of success in carrying out the combat training tasks.

Men from 20 nationalities serve in the combat engineer company under the command of the communist, Capt L. Nikitin. They live as a close combat soldier family. But

this does not mean that in the company there are no problems in unifying the collective. One of them was, for example, that some of the soldiers prior to induction in the army had a poor mastery of Russian. Many of them had no idea at all about the design, placement or deactivation of mines. The situation was complicated by the fact that literally a month after the arrival of the new recruits the company was to participate in carrying out combat training missions in a tactical exercise in the mountains where an important role was given precisely to the laying of minefields and the clearing of the routes.

Precisely due to the attention and concern of the more experienced comrades in arms, to the military fraternity and mutual help, the young soldiers quickly acquired the necessary skills and knowledge. They successfully carried out the tasks confronting them. Many of the combat engineers who had particularly distinguished themselves under the difficult conditions of a mountain desert terrain and who showed initiative and skill were commended by the command.

Military service will fulfill the role of a school of patriotism and internationalism only in the event that it is organized in full accord with the military laws and regulations and in a spirit of high reciprocal exactingness. At the same time, as was emphasized by the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, in the report at the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the high exactingness of the commanders without fail should be combined with measures of persuasion, by the organizing of party work to improve the quality and effectiveness of the political, military, moral and legal indoctrination of the servicemen, by a concern for maintaining a healthy moral climate in the subunits and by a fuller consideration of the particular features of the multinational military collectives.

In the tank subunit, where Capt Ya. Fedak is the deputy commander for political affairs [zampolit], from the very first days that the new recruits are present, they establish the background of the soldiers, what they engaged in prior to the army, where the parents live and work and whether or not they have any problems with Russian.... The commander, the zampolit, the members of the party bureau and the Komsomol activists endeavor to see to it that the young soldiers immediately feel that they have arrived in a close-knit military family. Of great importance from the pedagogical viewpoint is the fact that in the subunit of the tank troops prior to the exercises and the campaigns in the mountains, meetings are held with the motorized rifle troops, the artillery troops, combat engineers and the men of other specialties with whom the combat training exercise is to be jointly carried out. Thus, the tank crews, the motorized rifle squads and the artillery crews become acquainted and often work through the coordination elements and the variations of forthcoming "battles."

The men of our district are located territorially within several Central Asian republics the peoples of which have their own particular features and traditions. We take all of this into account in the ideological-indoctrinational work and in the patriotic and international indoctrination of the men. Certainly the morale of the personnel and the other important components in the combat readiness of the units and subunits are determined not only by the nature of the relationships between the servicemen within their own collectives, but also by the ties with the local population, with the party and soviet bodies, with the social organizations and production collectives. This is also one of the expressions of the spiritual ties with the people and the need for

the greatest possible strengthening of this tie was mentioned by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov in his report at the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries.

In the district it has become a tradition to hold talks, morning meetings, question and answer evenings on the general subject of "The Area in Which You Serve." An evening devoted to this subject to which were invited war and labor veterans and production pacesetters was recently held in the regiment which has initiated the socialist competition in the Turkestan Military District. In opening it, the unit zampolit quoted the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev from his speech at the ceremony in Tashkent on the occasion of the awarding of the Order of Lenin to Uzbekistan: "Precisely because Soviet Uzbekistan has constantly moved shoulder to shoulder, in an unbroken formation with all the fraternal peoples of the USSR, it has been able to rise so rapidly from its former backwardness and be turned into a well-developed, flourishing republic, one of the most advanced states of the East."

The speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the ceremonies in Tashkent had been thoroughly studied by all the servicemen categories. For this reason, during the evening there was an interesting discussion full of specific examples showing what Soviet Uzbekistan had achieved as part of the indestructible family of Soviet peoples. The men attending it from among the former students of the republic's higher institutions of learning described how since in 1920, under the decree signed by V. I. Lenin, the first VUZ in Uzbekistan was opened, now the Tashkent State University, public education in Uzbekistan has undergone great development. At present, there are already 43 VUZes in which representatives of virtually all the nationalities of the Soviet Union study as well as students from the socialist and other nations of the world.

Speaking about the advances of the Central Asian republics in the economy, in the social area and in culture, the participants of the evening gave examples showing the internationalism of the workers and their weighty contribution to the economic and cultural life of all our enormous nation and to the development of the friendship among Soviet peoples. The representatives from the Central Asian republics take an active part in carrying out the comprehensive program for the development of the Nonchernozem Area and are working in the major construction projects of our century, the development of the oil and gas resources of Tyumen and the construction of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline]....

The evening held in the regiment is just a hint of such work, work which is carried out in all the units and subunits. It has been well received among the men and has produced positive indoctrinational results. Very importantly, such measures are more often held with the participation of war and labor veterans and the leaders of enterprises and sovkhozes. For example, the director of the Plant imeni 26 Bakinskikh Komissarov, Mikhail Grigor'yevich Syrovets, has become a frequent and welcomed guest in the subunits of one of the district's remote garrisons. The Twice Hero of Socialist Labor Tursuna Akhunova and the Hero of Socialist Labor, the equipment operator Anvar Aliyev, are, as the men themselves say, considered one of their own in the district units. In turn, for the purposes of military-patriotic indoctrination, young officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants and soldiers who are pacesetters in military and political training and experts of the military specialties are sent to the sponsored enterprises, sovkhozes, kolkhozes and schools.

It is possible to speak about the close ties of the district units and subunits with the Uzbek and Turkmen peoples on many levels. We have established good contacts on all of them. Meetings are held not only in the officer and soldier clubs, but also at the training centers and in the tactical exercises and drills. In our garrisons, the leaders of the republic, oblast party and soviet bodies, the public organizations, the institutions and enterprises and heroes of the llth Five-Year Plan are well known.

The following facts also convincingly demonstrate the nature of the existing and continuingly developing ties between the men of the district and the workers of the Central Asian republics. In one of the rayons, there was a stubborn struggle underway for a high cotton crop. The bad weather was a problem with unseasonable rains. The men of the unit located in the territory of the rayon came to their aid. All together they were victorious in the peacetime battle. Later on together they celebrated this victory of labor and fraternity.

The combined agitation-propaganda detachments have made a great contribution to the international indoctrination of the men and to strengthening friendship with the local population. These have been organized from experienced political workers, lecturers and local party and Komsomol activists. The agitation and propaganda brigades are equipped with movie projectors and screens, sound equipment and other technical devices. And they work well in the trips. Each trip by the detachment is a major event in the life of the troop collectives and the workers of the towns and settlements through which it passes.

The correct combination of the national with the international and the common interests of the socialist nations give us an opportunity to indoctrinate the men as true internationalists. The propaganda personnel and military press also make their contribution to this matter. Incidentally, the newspaper of our Red Banner Turkestan Military District often makes it a practice to have combined issues with the newspapers and magazines of the socialist armies. Thus, in particular, the Czechoslovak military has learned about the life and combat training of the Turkestan men and we have become acquainted with the forms and methods of struggling for high military skill in the units and subunits of the Czechoslovak People's Army. A number of interesting selections have been prepared for FRUNZEVETS by the military journalists from the newspaper HAKIKATI SARBAZ (Soldier's Truth), the organ of the Afghan Ministry of Defense.

In the district troops great attention is given to propagandizing and carrying out the decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The Food Program adopted at it for the period up to 1990 is one of the most striking documents of recent years embodying the principles of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. The disclosure of its content has given all the ideological-indoctrination measures a more profound, concrete and stirring nature.

The indoctrination of the Turkestan military in a spirit of the friendship of the Soviet peoples, patriotism and internationalism in the district units and subunits is being carried out considering the existing international situation. U.S. imperialism and our class enemies, in using every means, are endeavoring to impose their views on the most diverse problems of domestic and international life. Proceeding from this, we view the unmasking of imperialist, bourgeois propaganda as one of the most important elements in patriotic and international indoctrination. In the units and subunits, particularly those which are in field conditions, political hours, political information

sessions and talks by the party and Komsomol activists are being held. In the course of these, they explain the true purpose of the false rumors spread by the various "radio voices" as well as the views of the events and facts coming from overseas.

Against the background of the general rise in the patriotic and international indoctrination of the unit and subunit personnel, we also see unsolved questions. In the district, there is still much to be done in order to make this work more effective and producing stable results and so that the best propaganda and party qualities of the commanders and political workers and the entire aktiv are involved in it.

"Our army," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in one of his speeches, "is a special army in the sense that it is a school of internationalism, a school for indoctrinating feelings of friendship, solidarity and mutual respect among all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union." This high praise by the General Secretary of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, obliges us to skillfully and rationally utilize the very rich experience and traditions in patriotic and international indoctrination as acquired by the USSR Armed Forces and to add to them in new searches and deeds for the good of the socialist motherland.

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#### ARMED FORCES

## LECTURE OUTLINE ON INDOCTRINATION OF MILITARY OATH, REGULATIONS

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[Article by Prof, Col V. Izmaylov: "The Demands of the Moral Code of a Builder of Communism—The Moral Basis of the Soviet Military Oath and Military Regulations"]

[Text] This subject opens a new section in the training plan "Communist Morality and Military Duty" which includes four subjects. These are to be studied during the winter training period after the subject "An Unbreakable Alliance of Free Republics." The exercises should be conducted by the method of narration and a lively, full debate.

A study of the given subject should help the students in more profoundly understanding the essence of communist morality and its fundamental distinction from morality in a bourgeois society. In the course of giving the material, it is important to show what comprises the unity of the principles of the moral code of a builder of communism, the provisions of the military oath and the requirements of the military regulations and to focus the students on their continuous fulfillment.

Six hours are assigned for studying the subject. Of these two should be assigned for the talk, two for independent work and two for a discussion.

In the talk, it is important to examine the following questions: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on communist morality and its fundamental distinction from bourgeois morality. 2. The unity of the moral requirements of the moral code of a builder of communism, the military oath and regulations.

In the brief introduction it is essential to point out that the Soviet man having grown up in the socialist system and indoctrinated by the Leninist party is the worthy builder of a new society. He combines in himself remarkable qualities such as high civil awareness, moral nobility and moral purity. The main source of the moral strength in Soviet people is a profound conviction in the rightness, invincibility of the ideas and principles of communism. Primarily ideological conviction above all else determines the spiritual make-up of the Soviet man and the soldier of the Armed Forces.

Communist morality underlies the life view of a soldier and sailor. The observance of the principles of communist morality is a standard in the life of the Soviet military. This is understandable. Certainly the basic demands of the moral code of a builder of communism have gained their legal strengthening in the military oath and regulations.

Hence, to be loyal to these demands is not only a moral duty, but also the official one of each soldier.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Communist Morality and Its Fundamental Distinction from Bourgeois Morality

An exposition of the first question is best started by explaining to the students what morality means in general. This is the aggregate of rules, principles and standards of human conduct and the obligations of persons in relation to each other and to society. In contrast to the moral standards expressed in laws behind which stands the strength of state authority, morality is based upon public opinion and upon the inner convictions of people, their habits and traditions.

The propagandist should then point out that over the entire history of mankind, people have been searching for a moral idea. Only the founders of scientific communism, K. Marx and F. Engels, were successful in establishing a truly scientific theory of morality. Having disclosed the dependence of morality upon the socioeconomic bases of social life, they decisively repudiated the idea of a "single and unchanged" morality for all times and all peoples, they completely established its class nature and showed the relationship of morality to the policy of the ruling classes, to religion, philosophy and art.

The ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels on communist morality were developed and enriched by V. I. Lenin. In speaking on the need to shape a new communist morality, Lenin pointed out that for the Soviet people what is moral is all that serves to destroy the old, exploiting society, the reactionary bourgeois psychology, private property beliefs, egoistic habits and prejudices; the moral is all that unites and consolidates the people in the construction of a new, communist world and forms their creative discipline. "At the basis of communist morality," V. I. Lenin taught, "lies a struggle for the strengthening and completion of communism. The basis of communist indoctrination, education and teaching consists in this" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 313).

Lenin scientifically established the outstanding role and significance of moral principles in the construction of socialism and showed the ways and methods of indoctrinating people in a spirit of communist morality. V. I. Lenin demanded that the entire cause of indoctrination, education and the teaching of modern youth be the inculcating of communist morality in them and be closely tied to the daily practice of building a new life. "Just because the revolution has started," he wrote, "people do not become saints.... Crushed capitalism is rotting and decaying among us, contaminating the air..., poisoning our life, entangling the new, fresh, the young, the live with thousands of threads and ties of the old, the rotten and the dead" (PSS, Vol 37, pp 60-61).

As is known, various classes create their own moral standards and rules of conduct. The morality of an exploiting society is based, in the words of V. I. Lenin, on the principle: either you plunder the other person or the other person plunders you, either you work for the other person or he for you, either you are the slaveholder or the slave (see PSS, Vol 41, p 312).

Under such conditions can all the people hold the same views about labor and social obligations? Can there be common interests among those who live off the blood and sweat of others and those who are enslaved and have no rights? Certainly not. V. I. Lenin showed that in a bourgeois society there cannot be uniform standards of morality,

since the content of the morality of the exploiting classes is aimed at preserving the existing social order while the morality of the exploited is aimed at overthrowing it.

Of course, the bosses of the capitalist world never openly state that their morality justifies the merciless exploitation of the workers. They hypocritically present their morality as "common to all man" and raise it to the rank of an "eternal truth" supposedly deriving from God. In actuality, its essence consists in extreme individualism, heartlessness, cynicism and falseness. Everything is permitted the strong and the rich. This is the motto which is implanted by the lackeys of imperialism and this is that unwritten law by which the representatives of the well-off classes in the capitalist nations live.

The particularly profound spiritual decline in bourgeois society is noticeable now. Its moral degradation is occurring in the most diverse forms such as the flourishing of corruption, the eliminating of moral criteria in the assessing of crime, the social degeneration of the workers, violence, an atmosphere of fear, universal suspicion and drug addiction. In the capitalist world everything is bought and sold, illegality is carried out in the name of the law, idols are created out of mediocrities and truly human ideals are rejected.

For example, in the United States there are 10 million alcoholics and 600,000 drug addicts. Here each year 10 million crimes are committed including murders, armed robbery, rape and so forth. One out of every five persons in this nation suffers from mental illness.

The amorality of the capitalist society is particularly apparent in its militarism and aggressiveness. "Adventurism and a willingness to wager the vital interests of mankind for the sake of their narrow, selfish goals," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "this is what is particularly apparent in the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 20).

The completely rotten moral ideas, traditions and habits of the bourgois world are opposed by the new, communist morality, the most humane and meeting the cherished ideas and interests of the masses of people. In the exercise it is essential to disclose the essence of our morality and its basic demands. The morality which guides us, pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, is a fusion of total dedication to the ideals of communism and high civil duty, a love for the socialist motherland and fraternal solidarity with the workers of all nations, collectivism and implacability for the violations of social duty (see "Leninskim kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 5, p 49). Our communist morality has rightly inherited and is developing the highest humanistic standards of morality worked out by the workers. Industriousness, honesty, humility, a feeling of ones own worth, comradeship and mutual respect—all of these are indispensable traits in the moral make-up of the Soviet man.

In the process of building a new society, communist morality has undergone further development. Clear reflection of the profound changes in the moral awareness of the Soviet people was the elaboration and incorporation of the moral code of a builder of communism in the CPSU Program. Its contents concretely indicate what moral principles and standards should be formed in the awareness and conduct of the Soviet people.

The 25th CPSU Congress devoted great attention to the further improving of moral relations in our society. The congress formulated the task of a comprehensive approach to the questions of the communist indoctrination of the workers. A unity of ideological, political, labor and moral indoctrination considering the specific features of each social group of the population is the essence of a comprehensive approach. The congress also defined as the main task in the area of moral indoctrination. This consists in developing in each Soviet person an activist position in life, when the unity of word and deed becomes a daily standard of conduct.

The 26th Party Congress also took up the further strengthening of the spiritual bases for the socialist way of life and the formation of a new man. The congress pointed out that the conditions under which the Soviet people live and work have changed significantly. On the basis of a steady economic rise, the entire system of social relationships and our socialist way of life have continued to improve. Its vivid manifestations are: the atmosphere of collectivism and comradeship, solidarity, the friendship of all the nations and peoples of the country and mental health. Soviet man has also become different. His knowledge has become richer, his erudition has increased and his spiritual needs have grown significantly.

The propagandist should point out that communist morality presupposes an organic unity of moral standards and effective conduct of people. Under socialism which once and for all has put an end to private ownership of the implements and means of production, the personal interests of man coincide with the social ones. Under these conditions inherent to people are an awareness of social duty and an intolerance of violations of public interests.

Our morality is the richest in its content. It includes the finest revolutionary aspirations of the working class, the progressive social force of modern times. In fighting for its liberation and the emancipation of all the workers, the working class has developed moral standards which require an aware subordinating of personal interests to social ones. In being guided by these, the Soviet workers, the kolkhoz members, the people of science and culture in each working day create ever-new material and spiritual riches and add to the moral values of a society of developed socialism.

In concluding the first question, it is essential to point out that communist morality has embibed the basic general human moral standards such as a decisive condemnation of social and national suppression, thievery, idleness, drunkenness, a disrespectful attitude toward women, hooliganism, deception and so forth. The moral standards which have developed in the thousand-year struggle of the masses against social inequality have become the unshakable rules in the life of each Soviet man.

At the same time, our morality has also included such new principles developed in the course of building a new life as dedication to the cause of communism, love for the socialist motherland and the socialist nations, a concern of each person for maintaining social wealth and conscientious labor for the good of society. These principles have been embodied in the CPSU Program and in the moral code of a builder of communism.

2. The Unit of the Moral Requirements of the Moral Code of a Builder of Communism, the Military Oath and Regulations

In turning to this question, it is desirable that the propagandist read to the students the content of the moral code of a builder of communism. Here it is important to

emphasize that the moral code establishes a new type of moral relations between people and has a number of fundamental features and traits which determine its essence.

In the first place, the entire aggregate of principles set forward in it is characterized by exceptional communist purposefulness and efficiency. The content of the code's principles clearly confirms the important provision of the CPSU Program which states that "in the process of the transition to communism, the role of moral principles grows evermore in the life of society and the sphere of action of the moral factor broadens...." ("Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], p 119).

Secondly, the moral code gives not individual standards of conduct, but rather forms the most important provisions in the theory of communist morality considering all types of moral ties and qualities, that is: the relationship of the individual to the collective and to society; relationships within the collective; relationships in the domestic sphere, the family and so forth.

Thirdly, all the principles of the moral code have an active, affirmative nature and require not only their knowledge, but also constant carrying out. The entire spirit of the code calls for the forming of the creative man, a fighting man ready at any moment to come to the defense of the victories of socialism.

Thus, the social function of the moral code is that it expresses the program of society's moral development and provides an opportunity for a man to voluntarily adhere to a true moral orientation, to see the goal of his labor activity and select the appropriate means for achieving it.

The propagandist should then point out that the principles of the moral code of a builder of communism have been reflected in the military oath and regulations, having assumed thereby the nature of an obligatory law for the Soviet military. Consequently, the demands of the moral code of a builder of communism, the oath and the regulations are largely uniform.

The students may question what has caused such a unity in the requirements of the oath, the regulations and communist morality? Certainly the standards of morality are observed primarily out of a person's inner convictions, voluntarily, while military discipline obliges one to act as the oath and the regulations require, regardless of the desire or mood.

It is essential to explain that the moral standards and the requirements of the regulations in our army carry out the same task, because the basis of both communist morality and the laws of military service is one, that is, the socialist social system where the production relations act in the form of comradely cooperation and mutual aid among exploitation-free workers. The moral standards and requirements of the regulations are formed under the directing action of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Communist Party, in expressing the fundamental interests of all our nation's workers. Both the state legal demands and the moral standards in a strong unity ensure the successful carrying out of the complex tasks to defend the motherland. In military service, there is not a single legal demand which does not have moral force. The obligations of any serviceman or any specialist, as expressed in the corresponding regulations, manuals and instructions, are based also on the principles of communist morality.

The unity of the legal and moral standards, however, does not exclude the presence also of a certain specific manifestation of these in the life of the Armed Forces. For example, an order or instruction, as legal acts, are more direct. They envisage both measures of commendation as well as punishment. The moral aspect of this unity is based basically on public opinion, on the authority and reputation of a person. The moral effect is more selective. Ultimately the legal and moral duties represent two aspects of the same duties which in the main and basic thing coincide. In complementing one another, they operate very productively and bring a great indoctrinational effect.

For example, take the most important principle of the moral code, dedication to the cause of communism and love for the socialist motherland. This principle has been clearly expressed in the military oath and military regulations. Certainly in taking the oath, a Soviet soldier vows to be loyal to his people, to his Soviet motherland and to the Soviet government until his last breath. He gives the oath to defend the motherland courageously and ably, with dignity and honor, sparing neither his blood nor life itself for achieving a full victory over the enemies.

This gives military service an elevated nature and particular nobility. A soldier or sailor is aware of his great responsibility for national security and for defending the peaceful labor of his people. It is no accident that in any feat, in a noble action or success in combat training one can see a spiritual zeal, a sincere and selfless daring for the sake of the high goals. A majority of our soldiers carry out their duty to the motherland honestly and conscientiously. And they do this not counting on any remuneration, not out of a fear of punishment, but because an awareness of their responsibility to the people does not allow them to act otherwise. The conscience is the strictest judge of their actions.

Here it is wise to tell the students how love for the motherland and loyalty to the military oath were manifested among the combat troops during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars and to give vivid examples of the heroic feats of the Soviet military for the sake of communism. Here is must be stressed that in the mass heroism of our soldiers and commanders one can feel the great spirit of the Soviet man, his loyalty to the revolutionary and military traditions and a readiness to sacrifice everything, even life itself, for the sake of the freedom and independence of our socialist motherland. "I saw the comrades die," wrote Aleksandr Matrosov in his last letter from the front. "Today the battalion commander told of an instance when a general was killed. He died facing the west. I love life. I want to live. But the front is a thing where you go on living and then a bullet or piece of shrapnel puts an end.... If I should happen to perish, I would like to die like that general did, in battle facing the west."

Now the entire world knows how Aleksandr Matrosov perished. At a critical moment of combat, when there was no other way out, he used his body to close off the firing slit of an enemy pillbox. The hero remained loyal to himself: he died in combat facing west. This example is no exception. Today we know the names of more than 300 Soviet soldiers who repeated the feat of Aleksandr Matrosov. Hundreds of courageous Soviet aces rammed the enemy in the air. Even the hit, burning aircraft were turned into a cutting weapon, cutting like a feiry scourge through the enemy troops.

In his book "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs] (the chapter "Little Earth"), Comrade L. I. Brezhnev called the Soviet soldiers knights of the spirit. The present generation of

defenders of the motherland also fully merits this high title. In peacetime the Soviet military are showing courage and heroism. Here are just a few examples. In one of the troop exercises in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, MSgt G. Korolev at the price of his own life saved the life of comrades. The pilot, Capt S. Arapov, from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany at the last moment of his life thought not about himself, but rather about the inhabitants of the settlement which the disabled aircraft was threatening. He could have catapulted out, but did not do this. In saving the commander, Pvt R. Churkveidze was killed by bandit bullets. There are numerous vivid examples of our soldiers who carried out their international duty in Afghanistan as part of the Soviet limited troop contingent.

Different years, different men, different feats. But they have the same basis--loyalty to the oath and regulations, love for the motherland and a readiness for self-sacrifice.

The propagandist should then explain to the students the demand of the moral code to work conscientiously for the good of society. Here it must be emphasized that this is expressed in the military oath and regulations. In taking the oath, a soldier vows to study military affairs conscientiously. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces obliges him to constantly improve his military and political knowledge, to take sacred care of the weapons, military and other equipment entrusted to him and to steadfastly endure all the hardships and deprivations of military service.

It is important to convince the students that intense efforts must be made to master military affairs and that military service in our nation has a socially useful nature. Certainly neither the worker, the kolkhoz member nor the scientist can work peacefully if the security of the motherland is not ensured. For this reason it can be said with full justification that in each ton of steel, coal and oil, in each quintal of harvested crop there is also a share of labor by the Soviet soldier.

The propagandist should point out that an important particular feature in military service is the fact that it is performed not only because of the state legal standards reinforced in the military oath and regulations, but also due to the moral drives of the soldier, that is, his feeling of duty to the motherland and an awareness of personal responsibility for its security. Precisely these drives engender the patriotic movements to master related specialties, for complete interchangeability in the teams and crews, for hitting the targets with the first shells, rounds or launches, for extending the operating life of military equipment between repairs, for saving fuels and lubricants and so forth. The noble moral drives of the defenders of the motherland were particularly apparent during the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. In competing to worthily celebrate this important jubilee under the motto "The Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People Must Be Securely Defended!," the personnel of the subunit, units and ships attained new heights in military service. In the exercise it is also essential to describe the winners of the competition and the pacesetters in military training in one's own military collective.

In speaking about the demand of the moral code to preserve and add to the commonweal, the propagandist should point out that in our nation the question of preserving socialist property is of fundamental significance. This is the basis of the socialist system, its economic foundation and the heritage of all the people. "The core of economic policy," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is a seemingly simple and very mundane thing, that is, an economic attitude toward the social good, and

the ability to fully and purposefully use all that we have" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 42).

Our state has elevated the demand of the maintaining of socialist ownership to a law and it has been set down in Article 61 of the USSR Constitution. It states that the USSR citizen must protect and strengthen socialist property. It is the duty of the USSR citizen to combat embezzlement and waste of state and public property and to show a thrifty attitude toward the wealth of the people.

To protect military and public property in every possible way is a sacred duty of a man in the Soviet Armed Forces and this is set down in the military oath and regulations. Certainly, weapons and military equipment comprise the material basis of army and navy military might and an inseparable component of the people's property. Weapons and military equipment require a careful and considerate attitude. They are the strength of the soldier and for this reason he should conscientiously and steadily study them, know them to perfection, keep them in complete readiness for use and protect them even under the most difficult conditions. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military saved military equipment even at the price of their own life. It would be possible to give many examples of the courageous actions of our soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers and officers in saving property and military equipment also in peacetime.

It is a demand of the regulations to value military comradeship, to help comrades in word and deed, to restrain them from unworthy actions and in sparing neither one's life, to help them out of danger. This expresses the principle of the moral code of "collectivism and comradely mutual aid: One for all and all for one." The moral nature of our society is such that people who have grown up in it do not think of themselves in isolation from their comrades in labor and the struggle. The labor and social activeness of people is fully manifested in the range of friends and fellow servicemen, their views and convictions are formed, civil maturity and responsibility to society are inculcated and such moral standards are established as an awareness of social duty. humane relations and mutual trust between people, honesty and justice, a spirit of collectivism and comradely mutual aid. "For a person, the collective in which he works is a sort of home, family and school," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "It is here that professional experience, skill and the habit of working conscientiously is passed on from generation to generation. It is precisely here in the heart of hearts that the youth learn communist ideological loyalty, loyalty to the party's cause and a readiness to always be ahead, in the most difficult and most crucial areas" ("Leninskim kursom," Vol 6, p 331).

The military collective is also a vital component particle of Soviet society with its inherent social and spiritual unity of the men, with the commonness of their interests and goals and dedication to the party's cause and the Soviet motherland. As in all our society, relations in it are based on a firm foundation of the Soviet social and state system, on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and on the principles of communist morality. As in any labor collective, here in a situation of mutual respect, trust and exactingness, high moral, political and moral qualities of the men are shaped. "Each military collective—from the subunit, unit and ship up to the Armed Forces as a whole," pointed out the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "is a close military family in which the men are indoctrinated in a spirit of fraternity, solidarity, respect and mutual aid." ("Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles," p 35).

In continuing the narration, it is essential to point out that our regulations and our morality do not allow us to overlook any manifestation of complacency, callousness or a disrespectful attitude toward a fellow serviceman. In giving examples of highly moral, comradely relations in the collective, at the same time it is essential to criticize the conduct of individual men who are not adverse to directing a "harsh word" against a fellow serviceman or insult a comrade.

For the Soviet man, including a soldier or sailor, it is not enough to assimilate and observe the moral principles. He must also have a feeling of responsibility for the conduct of others. A true friend and comrade is always a principled and direct person. He objectively, from the positions of communist morality judges the conduct of those around. And if, for example, he sees that one of the fellow servicemen is acting incorrectly, he without fail stops him and restrains him from an unworthy action. With good reason it is said: "Friendship is friendship, but service is service." This means that military duty is higher than all. And if a soldier has violated discipline and committed an unworthy action, while a comrade has appeared not to notice this, such conduct is far from true comradeship. Such a friendship has a shakey basis and does not lead to anything good.

The unity of the requirements of the moral code, the oath and regulations is most fully apparent in military discipline. Soviet military discipline is primarily a political and moral category. Its foundation rests on a profound conviction of the men and the spiritual maturity of the collective.

In order to show this notion more effectively to the students, it is essential to demonstrate the fundamental opposition in the nature of discipline in the socialist and capitalist armies. In the armed forces of the imperialist states, discipline is maintained by a fear of punishment and by the blind execution of the will of the exploiting classes by the mass of soldiers. For example, take the army of the most powerful nation in the capitalist world, the United States. Savage morals, arbitrariness and constant humiliation of the individual—all of this can be observed in the American barracks. Cynicism, mercilessness, cruelty and violence—this is the moral make-up of the American soldier. Under the influence of intensive ideological and moral-psychological pressure they endeavor to turn him into an obedient tool for the aggressive foreign and antipopular domestic policy of the reactionary circles.

Certainly in no instance can one speak about conscious military discipline. If such a warrior does carry out the demands of discipline, this is done only under the influence of external coercion, out of a fear of punishment and for selfish reasons.

Characteristic of the Soviet military is high self-discipline in which the unity of the legal and moral aspects is particularly apparent. Certainly self-discipline expresses a degree of awareness by the soldier and sailor where military duty is carried out by him out of his own internal conviction, and when an external legal demand (order or instruction) fully coincides with inner moral urges.

The propagandist should then point out that a harmonious unity of the demands of communist morality and military duty is achieved primarily by the development of communist convictions and political awareness in the men. The well-known Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979 emphasizes that the core of ideological and political indoctrination has been and remains the development of a scientific

ideology in the Soviet people, a wholehearted dedication to the cause of the party and to communist ideals, love for the socialist fatherland and proletarian internationalism. This applies fully also to the men of the Soviet Armed Forces. A knowledge of the requirements of the regulations by the soldiers and sailors, a profound conviction as to their special moral sense and a readiness to carry them out in practice and in service because of the command of one's conscience—this is the most dependable and reliable criterion for the ideological loyalty of a Soviet soldier. The inner voice of self-discipline and morality impel a serviceman with firm ideological convictions to conscientiously carry out his duty, even if the deeds are carried out alone and can remain unknown to anyone else. With good reason it is said that the self-discipline of a soldier is his conscience in action.

The maintaining of strict proper order in the subunit, unit or ship is of great importance for developing in the soldiers and sailors a uniform understanding of the requirements of communist morality, the military oath and regulations. Proper order presupposes the exemplary standing of alert duty, guard and internal duty, it includes the precise organization of combat and political training, the operation and maintenance of military equipment and presupposes correct relationships between the servicemen, the strict observance of the daily regimen, the reasonable organization of time off for the personnel as well as their high and conscious inner discipline. All of this instills in the men a respectful attitude toward the requirements of the military regulations and helps to shape the necessary moral and combat qualities in them.

The conscientious execution of duties by the soldiers and sailors rests on their profound awareness of personal responsibility to defend the socialist motherland and constitutional duty. The Army and Navy personnel with all their heart affirm the conviction expressed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress that the glorious defenders of the motherland in the future will vigilantly guard the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people. At present, when confronted with the real military threat deriving from the ruling circles of the imperialist states, and primarily U.S. imperialism, this confidence inspires each Soviet soldier to be even more acutely aware of his responsibility to the party and the nation for maintaining the Armed Forces in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff of any aggressor.

In concluding the material on the subject, it is essential to urge the soldiers and sailors to always be loyal to the military oath, to strictly follow the demands of the moral code of a builder of communism, to serve according to the regulations and do everything so as to justify the high praise which our party gave to the USSR Armed Forces at the 26th CPSU Congress. The duty and sacred obligation of the patriot soldier are to always be on guard and to securely defend the creative labor of the Soviet people, the builder of communism.

During the hours of independent study, the students should study the works of V. I. Lenin "The Tasks of the Youth Unions" (PSS, Vol 41, pp 298-318); "Programma KPSS," Part II, Section V, §1; The Report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 57-67); the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 19th Komsomol Congress (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 12, 1982, pp 5-10); the reports of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, at the 6th All-Army Conference

of Primary Party Organization Secretaries (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1982).

In the talk with the students, it is advisable to discuss the following questions: 1. What is morality, what is its essence? 2. What is the role of communist morality in the life of our society? 3. What is the fundamental distinction of communist morality from bourgeois? 4. On what is based the unity of the demands of the moral code of a builder of communism, the military oath and regulations? 5. Of what importance is the military oath and the military regulations for the moral indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel? 6. What is said in the military oath and military regulations about the moral-political qualities of the Soviet military? 7. What obligations are imposed on the personnel by the moral code of a builder of communism? 8. What is the personal responsibility of the Soviet soldier for defending the socialist motherland?

## Literature for Propagandists

- 1. V. I. Lenin, "How to Save Once and for All the Workers from the Suppression of the Landlords and Capitalists," PSS, Vol 38, pp 240-241.
- 2. V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Unions," PSS, Vol 41, pp 298-318.
- 3. V. I. Lenin, "On Proletarian Culture," PSS, Vol 41, pp 336-337.
- 4. "Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], Part II, Section V.
- 5. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Articles 31, 32, 62, 63.
- 6. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 57-67.
- 7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the 19th Komsomol Congress," KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 12, 1982.
- 8. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 24 May 1982," PRAVDA, 25 May 1982.
- 9. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee," PRAVDA, 21 February 1982.
- 10. D. F. Ustinov, "Report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries," KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1982.
- 11. A. A. Yepishev, "Report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries," KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1982.

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## ARMED FORCES

## MANUAL FOR COMPANY (BATTERY) POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICERS REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 82 (signed to press 20 Sep 82) pp 90-92

[Review by Maj Gen L. Balashov, deputy chief of the Political Directorate in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District of the book "Zamestitel' komandira roty (baterei) po politchasti" (The Deputy Company (Battery) Commander for Political Affairs), by N. I. Smorigo and P. F. Isakov, edited by Col Gen M. G. Sobolev, Voyenizdat, 1982, 256 pages, 50 kopecks]

[Text] Frequently, in line with my duties, I have spoken with the company political workers. I recall, 3 years ago, after a seminar a lively discussion was struck up with the deputy company commanders for political affairs about what they were reading and how they were broadening their viewpoint. The young political workers told me much that was interesting. Of course, they also took up the problems of their professional growth.

"What we need," said one lieutenant, "is something to read about the company political worker, his experience and work methods."

"There was such a book," said Officer B. Salekhov in clarification. "It was called "Zamestitel' komandira roty po politchasti" [The Deputy Company Commander for Political Affairs]. It quickly sold out and now is impossible to find."

Since then, I have repeatedly heard similar requests. And now the book which the political workers were waiting for has appeared [the reviewed book].

What is it about, this book? About the most diverse aspects in the activities of the deputy company (battery) commander for political affairs, but primarily about his place in the life of the troop collective. In calling the company political worker the "right hand" of the commander in the struggle for combat readiness and for indoctrinating high moral-combat qualities in the men, the authors emphasize how diverse and broad is the range of his duties. "Without exaggeration it can be said," the book points out, "that there is no question, area of life, training and service of the men which does not require his concern and attention."

Very true words! I am very convinced of this and know from my own experience that things always go better where the company political worker shows an inherent all-encompassing vision and where he never lets even a minor point escape from his view.

For successfully carrying out his official duties, the deputy company (battery) commander for political affairs should possess many qualities. These qualities are not merely listed in the book. The authors in a way lead the young political worker to the notion that if he has chosen such a profession, then great obligations have been placed on him. He has become a political worker and this means that he must always endeavor to have profound ideological and theoretical knowledge as these are the sources of his strength. Since you are the commander's first assistant in the training and indoctrination of the men, you cannot count on success without an excellent knowledge of military affairs, the military equipment and weapons.

It is equally essential for the company political worker to have a broad cultural viewpoint, extensive knowledge in the area of party construction, pedagogics and psychology. A daily, hourly concern for subordinates should be inherent to him, combined with a party principledness and great exactingness for them. All of this, ultimately, is inconceivable without great exactingness for oneself and a personal example in the observance of socialist legality and military order.

In any undertaking an enormous role is played by a plan. Without this it is impossible to count on serious success in work. This truth tested out by life has direct bearing upon the activities of the company political worker. The planning of political indoctrination in the subunit is entrusted precisely to him. The small but informative section of the book contains a number of useful recommendations on this question. It is particularly valuable that a sample plan for political indoctrination with the company personnel is offered to the political workers. In reading it, it is not difficult to understand how one should approach such planning in one's subunit.

Among all the tasks carried out by the deputy company (battery) commander for political affairs the ideological tempering of the men is rightly in the forefront. As a convincing confirmation of this idea, the reviewed work quotes the widely known conclusion of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev given in the book "Malaya Zemlya." "If one considers," writes L. I. Brezhnev, "that the combat spirit of the troops has always been recognized as the most important factor in the tenacity of the troops, then during the war years the sharpest weapon was given precisely to the political worker. He hardened the souls and hearts of the men, without which neither the tanks, the cannons nor the aircraft would have brought us victory."

This task under the present-day conditions of an increased military danger, is particularly pertinent. How can it be carried out? What forms of work should be used?

The answers to these questions are found in the chapter "The Ideological-Political Tempering of the Personnel." It starts by examining the most important problems posed in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination." Then the discussion moves on to the practical activities of the deputy company (battery) commander for political affairs. In particular, there is a detailed examination of his role in organizing political exercises for the soldiers and sergeants. The company political workers in the book will find recommendations on making up political exercise groups and recruiting volunteer propagandists and their assistants.

Special approval should be given to the fact that the practical questions of ideological and political indoctrination for the men are examined through the prism of the advanced experience of political workers. As an example, take the daily leadership over the

activities of the volunteer propagandists. Many school graduates often become lost and do not know what their role is and how to start work with the leaders of the political exercise groups.

Lt V. Kutelyapov felt precisely this. At first, he could not establish the ways of his influence on training the leaders of the political exercise groups and had little supervision over their independent preparations. This told negatively upon the level of the political exercises. Experienced comrades pointed out the oversights to the young propagandist and helped him eliminate them. Since then things have gone better for the lieutenant.

On the eve of political exercises for the next subject, he made it a habit to hold special meetings for the group leaders and their assistants. In them the propagandists were advised how to better link the material being studied with the tasks of the company personnel, how to more effectively use the visual aids and involve the students in an active discussion of the subject.

Moreover, the young political worker began to more carefully prepare open lessons, he organized the reciprocal visiting for the leaders of the exercise groups and taught them to actively use the technical propaganda media.

The experience of this and other officers described in the book helps the company political workers more clearly define their place in carrying out the tasks of political training for the personnel and to more quickly acquire the skills of working with the leaders of the political exercise groups and their assistants.

As is known, in ideological and political indoctrination of the men, an important place is held by various forms of mass agitation work. But are these always fully utilized? We feel they are not. In our view, the reviewed publication will help the officers make up for this lack. The book tells in detail just what the political information sessions and Lenin Readings, Lenin lessons, special-subject evenings, assemblies and meetings, question and answer evenings and debates should be. Advice is given on how to better and most effectively prepare and conduct each of these measures.

One of the primary areas in the activities of the deputy company (battery) commander for political affairs is the struggle for the high combat training of the men. The importance of this work stems from the increased demands which are now placed on the combat training of the troops. The book cites the words of the USSR minister of defense and which reveal its essence. "Combat readiness," stressed Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "is an alloy of the technical equipping of the troops, their military skills, moral-political, psychological and physical conditioning, organization and readiness of each Soviet soldier to carry out a feat for the sake of fulfilling his duty to the motherland.... The most important components of combat readiness are the ideological-political conditioning of the personnel, high military skill and the ability to withstand great moral-psychological and physical stresses."

From this view it follows that one of the main elements of combat readiness is the combat skills of the personnel. The basic efforts of the company political worker are also aimed at improving these. Here the range of his concerns is very broad: from mobilizing the men to reduce the time required to bring the subunit to combat readiness to attention to how the skill of each specialist is growing.

For this, the political worker, first of all personally and with the aid of the aktiv, explains to the men the party and government instructions on the questions of strengthening national defense and raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces as well as the requirements of the military oath, the regulations, orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense. He instills love for the weapons and confidence in their strength. This is not an easy task. It can be successfully carried out only under the condition of the active employment of all forms and means of political indoctrination.

The level of the combat skill of the men depends largely upon the organizing of the socialist competition. If it has been properly organized, if it is carried out daily, and encourages competitiveness and the emulating of advanced experience, then this inevitably tells on the company's deeds, upon increasing the training level of the men and the growth of their skills.

The authors of the reviewed work focus the company political workers precisely on organizing such a competition. They, in relying on troop experience, advise how to better develop a competition between the individual servicemen, the squads and platoons, how to help the men in working out individual obligations and ensure the publicizing and comparison of results and the dissemination of advanced experience.

In the book there is the very instructive chapter devoted to instilling a spirit of discipline in the men. As is known, persuasion is the basic method in forming this quality, as for many others. Due to persuasion the men are able to lose harmful habits and they alter their attitude toward service and life. One such episode is given in the book.

"I," said Vladimir X. making a clean breast of it, "went into the army with bad boyish habits and returned home with a long list of commendations in my official record. I am now more content with myself and am not afraid to look people in the eye. For me, the army was a great school and I will always be grateful to it and grateful to my commanders, superiors and comrades who straightened me out and taught me that it is essential to serve and work honestly and to carry out one's duty to the motherland."

Undoubtedly, it is pleasant to hear such words of gratitude. But how much effort had to be spent before this! What great indoctrinational pressure must be put on a person before he returns to the main road and becomes disciplined!

In the company or battery this process of a soldier's development is actively directed by the deputy subunit commander for political affairs. He influences the person being indoctrinated personally, he has an impact through the commanders, the party and Komsomol organization and also resorts to the aid of friends and comrades. How to put all of this into action and use it with the greatest effectiveness—this is what, one feels, has been the real concern of the book's authors. And for these questions they have provided an answer that is sound in content and vivid in form of exposition.

As is known, a party organization's successful carrying out of the tasks entrusted to it, its activeness, militancy and purposefulness depend largely upon what role the subunit commander and his deputy for political affairs play in party work. From this viewpoint, the book has quite rightly given great attention to taking up the activities of the deputy company (battery) commander for political affairs as the organizer of party work.

The most different questions are examined here. For example, ensuring the examples set by the communists in carrying out service duties, in the socialist competition, in raising their ideological-theoretical level, observing the requirements of military discipline and the standards of communist morality, in organizing internal party work the indoctrination of the best party qualities in the CPSU members and candidate members and party leadership of the Komsomol.

Particular attention has been given to those forms of work which make it possible to instill the qualities of an active party fighter in the communists. For example, there is a detailed description of the role and place of party assignments in this question. In order to work them out reasonably, the book emphasizes, first of all there should be a study of the strengths and capabilities of each person, the level of his knowledge, experience in life and inclinations. It is important to know ahead of time what one or another comrade is capable of, in what areas his abilities can best be manifested. Only under this condition is the authority of the party assignments and their effectiveness increased as well as the activeness and militancy of the party organizations.

Many pages have been given in the book to the leadership of the Komsomol organization by the deputy company commander for political affairs. Just how is this leadership manifested? "Primarily in the fact," the authors point out, "without interfering or impeding the initiative of the Komsomol members, to promptly and clearly define the basic tasks of its work and to help in seeking out the most effective ways for carrying them out." The course of the authors' further line of reasoning and the numerous examples in the practice of the company political workers indicate how this is to be implemented.

Nor have they overlooked such urgent problems as organizing mass cultural measures in the companies and individual work with the men. With particular detail they investigate the method of a differentiated approach to indoctrinating the servicemen in a spirit of high discipline and efficiency.

The reviewed book is an undoubted success for the authors. They have done great work, they have thoroughly studied and generalized the advanced experience of the best political workers and have considered many requests from the readers as voiced in the publishing of such editions. The book has been received by many readers with pleasure and gratitude and for the company political workers it has become a good aid which helps them in carrying out the tasks of training and indoctrinating the armed defenders of the motherland.

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## STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

## HISTORICAL MATERIALS ON ROCKET TROOPS, ARTILLERY GIVEN

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 82 (signed to press 20 Sep 82) pp 46-50

[Unattributed article: "Always on Guard"]

[Text] Missile Forces and Artillery Day holds a worthy place in the history of the combat glory of the Soviet Armed Forces. This is a national holiday. It dates back to a major event in the Great Patriotic War, to the heroic battle on the Volga. Some 40 years ago, in November 1942, heavy salvos of artillery pieces, mortars and rocket launchers announced the start of the counteroffensive by the Red Army at Stalingrad. This ended with the encirclement and complete defeat of the 330,000-strong grouping of Nazi troops. In the engagements on the Volga, the enormous role of Soviet artillery became apparent.

To commemorate its achievements in fighting against the enemy, in 1944, by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 19 November was declared to be Artillery Day, and since 1964 this has been celebrated as Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. This change in the holiday's name reflected those profound, truly revolutionary changes which had occurred in the organizational structure and technical equipping of our Armed Forces and was recognition of the enormous importance of the rocket forces in strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and the entire world socialist commonwealth.

This year the traditional holiday of the rocket and artillery troops is being celebrated in a situation of great political and labor activeness by the Soviet people and the widely developed socialist competition to successfully carry out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and for properly celebrating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. The workers of our multinational motherland, rallied closely around the Leninist party into a single multinational family, are steadily strengthening the economic and defense might of their motherland.

The tasks of communist construction in our land must be carried out under difficult foreign political conditions. The aggressive forces of imperialism, primarily American, are endeavoring to divert international relations from the path of detente. The United States is involving other nations in various regions of the world in the orbit of its military preparations.

The Soviet Union is opposing the aggressive reactionary policy of imperialism with a policy of active defense of peace and strengthening of international security. This was affirmed by the 26th CPSU Congress and has been developed and concretized in the subsequent party and state documents.

In demonstrating its loyalty to peace, good will and responsibility for the destiny of the peoples, the Soviet Union has assumed the obligation of not being the first to employ nuclear weapons and is struggling to ban these weapons.

The consistent peaceableness of the USSR also presupposes a constant concern for national security. The given position was clearly expressed in the report of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "In order that our creative plans be carried out, we must preserve the peace. For this reason we will maintain the nation's defense capability on the proper level...." This anticipates a greater attention to combat readiness, to improving troop control and to raising the moral and political tempering of the troops.

The rocket and artillery troops are making a worthy contribution to strengthening the defense might of the socialist state. Like all the men of the Armed Forces, they see their duty in maintaining high vigilance and sustaining constant combat readiness and ensuring a dependable defense of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people who are building communism.

The Soviet artillery commenced its campaign record during the October days of 1917. During the years of the Civil War, the Communist Party, in solving the questions of military organizational development, devoted constant attention to the establishing and development of this branch of troops. This can be seen, in particular, from the military correspondence of V. I. Lenin relating to the period of the Civil War and foreign intervention. During those years, Lenin drew attention of the appropriate party organizations and military bodies to the enormous importance of creating the artillery units, to concentrating and shifting them to the most dangerous areas of the front.

The enemy felt the terrible force of our artillery. For courage and valor shown in the struggle against the interventionists and White Guards during the years of the Civil War, 18 artillery units were awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner. Thousands of artillery troops received orders. Among them were the platoon commander of the 3d Battery of the 1st Battalion V. Shmidt, the commander of the 3d Light Artillery Battalion of the 51st Division L. Govorov (subsequently, Mar SU) and others.

Having defended the freedom and independence of the world's first worker and peasant state, our people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, began peaceful socialist construction. Simultaneously, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, in carrying out Lenin's legacy, undertook measures to further improve the Armed Forces. An important stage in carrying out this task was the prewar five-year plans. The increasing pace of economic growth and the development of the defense industry provided an opportunity to technically reequip all the branches of troops, including the artillery as the main fire force of the Red Army. During the prewar years, the troops received modernized cannons, howitzers and automatic guns. The number of artillery weapons increased constantly: over the years of the First Five-Year Plan it increased by 2.4-fold (from 7,000 to 17,000 barrels), during the Second Five-Year

Plan by 2-fold and in the Third Five-Year Plan (by June 1941) by more than 1.5-fold. The artillery and mortar systems delivered to the army in qualitative terms significantly surpassed the best foreign models.

The combat might of the Soviet artillery underwent serious testing in the battles against the Japanese militarists at Lake Khasan in 1938 and on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939. Our artillery troops then showed great military skill, self-sacrifice and heroism. Here the squad commander of 45-mm cannons, Lt I. Lazarev, was the first Soviet artilleryman to receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and valor. In August 1939, here also, on the Khalkhin-Gol River for the first time in the world a group of Soviet fighters employed a mighty new weapon, rockets. The first page was opened in the history of the combat employment of reactive weapons.

The design bureaus headed by V. G. Grabin, F. F. Petrov, I. I. Ivanov, B. I. Shavyrin and others made a significant contribution to developing the new artillery systems.

During those years, our rocket construction was established as an industry. The theoretical bases for this had been worked out by the prominent Russian scientists N. I. Kibal'chich, K. E. Tsiolkovskiy and N. Ye. Zhukovskiy. Even at the very beginning of the 1930's, the collective of the gas dynamics laboratory organized in Leningrad created rocket projectiles for aviation and a jet-propelled antitank rifle. Soviet scientists developed rocket missiles and the BM-8 and BM-13 multiple launchers. On 17 June 1941, at a testing range during the inspection of new types of Red Army weapons the first rocket launches were made from the BM-13 launchers. The People's Commissar of Defense, Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko, the People's Commissar for Weapons D. F. Ustinov, the Chief of the General Staff, Army Gen G. K. Zhukov who were present at the testings had high praise for these weapons. On 21 June 1941, a decision was taken to produce these weapons serially. Thus arose the legendary "katyushas" [rockets].

The Great Patriotic War was a severe trial and thorough testing of the Soviet Armed Forces as it was the severest of all the wars which our motherland had ever experienced. The remarkable qualities of the Soviet military, including the artillery troops, were disclosed fully on the fronts. These included total dedication to the motherland, heroism, combat skill, discipline and an ignorance of fear in fighting the enemy. During the very first days of the war, an immortal feat was performed by the gunner of the 8th Battery of the 9th Antitank Brigade, the deputy political leader and Komsomol member Serov. In repelling the attack of a large group of Nazi tanks on the approaches to the city of Shyaulyay, the artillery troops hit 11 enemy vehicles. Severely wounded, Serov did not leave his place by the gun and hit another 7 enemy tanks. For the courage and herosim shown, Serov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On 14 July 1941, for the first time a battery of rocket artillery under the command of Capt I. A. Flerov made its first devastating strike against the Nazis. The strike was stunning for the enemy and it spread fear of the new weapon in the ranks of the Nazis. From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, the State Defense Committee, in considering the might of the fire strike of the rocket weapons, issued orders to organize units armed with the BM-13 and BM-8 combat vehicles.

In the course of the war, Soviet artillery added to its glorious combat traditions. In terms of fire power and organizational structure, it surpassed the enemy artillery. Over the war years, there grew up a galaxy of talented artillery leaders who could direct the combat employment of artillery and use it to achieve victory over the strong, technically equipped enemy. Among them were the Chief Mars Art N. N. Voronov and M. I. Nedelin, Mars Art M. N. Chistyakov, N. D. Yakovlev, V. I. Kazakov, G. F. Odintsov and Yu. P. Bazhanov, Col Gens Art I. I. Volkotrubenko, M. P. Dmitriyev and N. N. Zhdanov and many others.

The Communist Party, the Soviet government and our people had high regard for the accomplishments of the artillery troops in the Great Patriotic War. For courage and valor and for the able mastery of the powerful weapons, over 500 of the most distinguished artillery units and formations were awarded the high title of guards, while around 800 regiments, brigades and divisions received orders; many of them were given honorary names such as "Warsaw," "Vienna," Budapest," "Berlin," "Khingan," and others. Some 1,855 soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals in the artillery troops were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Two artillerymen, V. S. Petrov and A. P. Shilin, received this high title twice. The artilleryman A. V. Aleshin was the only Hero of the Soviet Union to receive the Order of Glory of all three degrees. Some 1.6 million artillery troops received orders and medals for their military service. These included Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Armenians, Georgians, Kazakhs, Tatars and representatives of the other Soviet nations and nationalities. "During the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War the fraternal peoples shoulder to shoulder came to the defense of the motherland," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR," "they demonstrated mass heroism and a steadfast will for victory, they routed the Nazi invaders and saved the peoples of the world from enslavement and destruction."

The victories of the Soviet Army on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War were secured by titanic work, by the truly heroic efforts of the workers of the rear who continuously and in growing amounts supplied the front with equipment, weapons and ammunition. This made it possible to utilize an enormous amount of artillery in the major engagements: in December 1941 at Moscow, around 8,000 guns and mortars; in 1942, at Stalingrad some 14,200; and in 1945, in the Berlin Operation around 42,000.

The enterprises in the defense industry sectors made a major contribution to supplying the troops with first-rate weapons, mortars and ammunition. These sectors were headed by the people's commissars D. F. Ustinov, B. L. Vannikov and P. I. Parshin. On the banners of many plants are Orders of the Soviet Union which they received for producing artillery weapons. Tens of thousands of workers, engineers and scientists directly involved in producing the weapons received high government awards.

In celebrating Rocket Forces and Artillery Day, the Soviet people and their military express profound gratitude toward the Communist Party. In its daily leadership lies the main source of all our successes on the battlefields and the crucial condition for the military might of the Soviet state.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was a forceful warning to those who are hatching plans for a new world war. The experience of history has clearly confirmed that the progress of mankind toward socialism and communism cannot be halted by any means, including military.

But the lessons of history have not been learned by the imperialists. In postwar times, the words of V. I. Lenin have been convincingly reaffirmed that imperialism "is marked

by the least peaceableness and love of liberty and by the greatest and ubiquitous development of the military." The imperialist circles, primarily in the United States, are openly and brazenly endeavoring to proclaim the right to impose their will on the world. The USSR has taken every possible measure to prevent the use of atomic energy for military purposes and to ban this, but the United States has actually undermined the constructive proposals for a complete ban and destruction of nuclear weapons.

Under the conditions of nuclear blackmail, the problems of the further development of the USSR Armed Forces have become evermore acute. Considering the experience of the last war and a profound scientific analysis of the existing situation as well as the development trends of military affairs and the nation's economic capabilities, the Communist Party has indicated the basic directions of its military organizational development.

Among these directions which determine the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the creation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is one of the leading ones. This has been an imposed measure undertaken by the USSR in response to the threat of nuclear bombing of the socialist nations. Relying on the increased capabilities of the socialist economy, the achievements of Soviet science and technology and the unstinting labor of the Soviet people, the CPSU and the Soviet government have successfully carried out the task of creating nuclear missile weapons.

Prominent scientific, design and engineer personnel have been involved in carrying out this task. Among them are the prominent scientists S. P. Korolev, M. V. Keldysh, M. K. Yangel' and others. By the middle of the 1950's, our nation had developed and commissioned various classes and types of missiles with high technical performance.

The interests of increasing the defense capability of the Soviet motherland demanded the rapid development of a missile capable of reaching targets at any point of the world. In 1957, such a missile was developed. This was a missile with engines having a power of several million horsepower and a speed of flight of 28,000 km per hour, that is, 20-fold faster than an aircraft and 10-fold faster than an artillery shell.

The world socialist system acquired its own missile shield. The development of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile marked the end of the invulnerability and unattainability of the aggressor at whatever point in the world he was.

The appearance of nuclear missile weapons led to revolutionary changes in military affairs. The views were revised on the conduct of war as a whole. The creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces upon a decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government was the most vivid expression of the profound qualitative changes in military affairs.

The leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet government devoted a great deal of attention to organizing the rocket troops. During those years, the office of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, became a true headquarters for directing work in the area of missile development. L. I. Brezhnev delved deeply into the problems confronting the developers of the missile systems and helped in rapidly resolving them.

In the chronicle of the development and combat activities of the troops which became the basic striking power of the Soviet Armed Forces are found the names of the famous military leaders who led these troops including Heroes of the Soviet Union, Mar Art M. I. Nedelin, Mars SU K. S. Moskalenko, S. S. Biryuzov and N. I. Krylov. Since April 1972, the Strategic Rocket Troops have been headed by Hero of Socialist Labor, Army Gen V. F. Tolubko.

Due to the daily concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, the Strategic Rocket Troops have grown, matured and become the dependable shield for the security of our motherland and all the nations of the socialist commonwealth and the basic means for restraining the aggressor and preserving peace.

During the brief historical period of their existence, the rockets troops have achieved a qualitatively new level of development. At present, they possess automated missile complexes of varying power and purpose with a high degree of readiness for combat employment.

Along with the development of the rocket troops, the conventional and rocket artillery has undergone further development at the present stage. It presently remains a powerful means for hitting the enemy on the battlefield. Present-day artillery possesses great mobility, maneuverability and accuracy in hitting the targets.

No matter how powerful modern military equipment may be, the crucial force in a war has been and remains the man who is ideologically convinced and has mastered the weapons assigned to him. The weapons and military equipment can provide a proper effect only in the instance, emphasized the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov in a report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, if they are in able and dependable hands, if their study, the mastery of the methods of combat employment are combined with a further improvement in the field, air and sea skills of the men, with the development of tactics and operational art, with the combat coordinating of the subunits, units and ships.

The profound changes which have occurred in the sociopolitical development of our society have told favorably on the political awareness and the general educational training of the men. At present, virtually all the rocket and artillery troops have a higher and secondary education. The units are headed by experienced, highly skilled commanders. In the rocket troops, around 80 percent of the officers have a higher command and engineer education and 90 percent are highly skilled specialists and true masters of military affairs. The political workers have also proven to be able indoctrinators. They are the soul of the military collectives, they constantly and deeply delve into the needs and wants of the men and by their inspired party word and personal example mobilize the men to improve the quality of combat training and better the military skills.

The party organizations have become the political nucleus of the military collectives and true centers for daily ideological indoctrination. They are at work in the very thick of the mass of servicemen and by all their work contribute actively to carrying out party policy in the area of strengthening national defense. In their work the party organizations have focused their basic efforts on carrying out the main tasks of combat readiness, at the strengthening of military discipline, and indoctrinating the personnel; they are working steadily to see that the communists set an example in carrying out service duty.

The Komsomol organizations are the combat assistants of the commanders and party organizations in carrying out the tasks confronting the units and subunits. In fulfilling the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and being guided by the decisions of the 19th Komsomol Congress, they have increased their activity in the communist indoctrination of Army and Navy youth. Many Komsomol members have proven to be dependable assistants of the commanders and party organizations in the struggle to raise the combat readiness of the units and ships. Presently, one out of every three Komsomol members in the rocket troops is an outstanding man in military and political training. Over 60 percent of the Komsomol members are specialists first and second class.

The present generation of rocket and artillery troops has inherited and is sacredly continuing the combat traditions of those who have defended the victory of October during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars.

Many units of the rocket troops and artillery in peacetime have received combat orders and the Pennant of the USSR Minister of Defense for Courage and Military Valor for the successes achieved in mastering the new military equipment and for high combat readiness. In carrying out the tasks related to maintaining combat readiness, the personnel of the rocket troops and artillery have demonstrated examples of courage and true heroism. The glorious deeds of the rocketmen Bushuyev, Panchishkin, Zakir'yanov, Basov, Nikishev, Dubrovin and Kuznetsov who have been awarded orders for courage serve as an example to be imitated by the men serving in the rocket garrisons.

The rocket and artillery troops, like all the men of the Armed Forces, are celebrating their traditional holiday by successfully concluding the training year. The exercises and field firings held have demonstrated an increased operational, tactical and weapons training of the men. A predominant number of the combat training launches and artillery firings were carried out with excellent grades. A majority of the rocket and artillery troops successfully fulfilled the assumed socialist obligations.

In the vanguard of the socialist competition to worthily celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and carried out under the motto "The Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People Must Be Securely Defended!" is the personnel of the unit under the command of Lt Col I. Shelestov, the initiator of this movement in the Strategic Rocket Troops. The unit's collective has completely fulfilled the assumed socialist obligations and for seven times running has won the title of outstanding. Some 100 percent of the unit's personnel are class specialists, including 79 percent specialists first and second class. More than one-half of the officer personnel is masters of military affairs. This collective in which men from 11 nationalities are serving is marked by closeness, mutual aid, comradely mutual assistance and a constant desire to be ahead.

The holiday has been marked by high results for the rocket and artillery troops in the units in which Officers A. Kas'yanov, A. Filippov, V. Belousov, K. Kalugin, O. Karateyev, A. Khomyakov, A. Kislyanskiy, P. Durava and others serve.

In the troops there is an effective struggle underway to increase the number of outstanding men in military and political training as well as outstanding crews and subunits. Many men have mastered related specialties and this is of great importance for the combat activities of the troops.

The commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations are endeavoring to strengthen the positive results and are mobilizing the personnel to further increase combat readiness and to strengthen organization and discipline.

In the course of the reports and elections of the party bodies, the communists have profoundly analyzed their activities in carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. They are setting specific measures to further improve party political work and to increase its effectiveness.

The personnel of the rocket troops and artillery are fully aware that in the present difficult military-political situation there is no more important and honorable task than ensuring the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. The rocket and artillery troops, like all the men of the Armed Forces are always on guard. At any moment they are ready to come to the defense of the state interests of their motherland and the cause of peace and socialism.

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## LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

## FOOD PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY UNITS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 82 (signed to press 20 Sep 82) pp 38-44

[Article by Lt Gen M. Manakin, deputy commander for the rear of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District and chief of the district rear services, Hero of the Soviet Union: "The Soldier's Mess Will Be Richer"]

[Text] In outlining a broad and diverse program for social development and increasing the prosperity of the people, the 26th Party Congress put in the forefront the task of improving the supply of food products to the nation's population. Upon the initiative of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the USSR Food Program has been worked out to solve this problem for the period up to 1990. This program is a most important component in the party's economic strategy for the current decade. This program was approved at the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Our party, in consistently carrying out the agrarian policy elaborated at the historic March (1965) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and developed in subsequent plenums and in the 23d-25th CPSU Congresses, has carried out great work to ensure a rise in agricultural production. The physical plant of the agroindustrial complex has been significantly strengthened, the use of chemistry and land reclamation have been rapidly developed, agroindustrial enterprises and associations have been organized and agricultural machine building has undergone further development.

In utilizing the increased economic potential, the party has now set the task of supplying the population with all types of food as rapidly as possible and substantially improving the quality of the diet by increasing the consumption of the most valuable food products. In particular, we plan to fully meet the demand for such products as groats, confectionary goods, margarine, eggs and fish, as well as improve the supplies of meat, milk, vegetable oil and fruits and vegetables. During the current decade there is to be a significant increase in the production of fruits, vegetables and potatoes.

All the personnel of the Moscow Military District has received the historic decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee with great exhilaration and unanimous approval and they are making their own definite contribution to carrying out the Food Program. The tasks stemming from the plenum's decisions were thoroughly discussed at a session of the district military council and at party aktiv meetings of the formations, the military schools and in the primary party organizations.

In the aim of thoroughly explaining the documents of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to the servicemen, the workers and white collar personnel of the Soviet Army, in the district troops diverse forms of ideological and political indoctrination, political and party studies and economic education are being employed. These include: lectures and reports, unified political days, meetings of the personnel with the leaders of the local party and soviet bodies, with scientists as well as pacesetters in industry and agriculture.

Our commanders, the political bodies and party organizations are doing a great deal to make the men aware of the economic strategy and agrarian policy of the CPSU and the sociopolitical and defense importance of the Food Program. They are endeavoring to evoke in the men an ardent desire to make their own personal contribution to carrying out the party's truly grandiose plans.

We realize that the instructions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in terms of our conditions are directed primarily to the workers of the district's military sovkhozes. We clearly see one of the basic tasks in turning these farms into model agricultural enterprises and increasing the production of meat, milk, eggs and other products here. It is essential to point out that in recent years great attention has been given to strengthening the labor collectives of the sovkhozes with personnel and to developing the socialist competition for achieving high productiveness in livestock and crop raising.

The sovkhozes completed the 10th Five-Year Plan successfully. Around 2 million rubles of profit were received. The plan quotas are being successfully fulfilled also in the llth Five-Year Plan. Regardless of the bad weather conditions, the sovkhozes completed last year with high indicators. The plans were fulfilled by 117 percent for egg production, and by 104 percent for meat (dressed). The milk yield per fodder cow was 3,548 kg and the number of eggs per layer was 228. Some 600 tons of meat, around 2,000 tons of milk and more than 6 million eggs were produced. The total volume of sold product for the military sovkhozes in 1981 was 3.3 million rubles.

A full amount of good quality feed was prepared. As is known, the feed supply in livestock raising is the main condition for maintaining the herd and increasing its productiveness. A good feed "stock" helped in successfully carrying out the plans for the first half of the current year and to even overfulfill the plan by 40 percent for meat production. Our military sovkhozes carried out the spring field work in an organized manner, on time and efficiently. This established the bases for a good harvest.

This year, the district agricultural enterprises must produce more than 770 tons of meat (on the hoof), more than 2,200 tons of milk and 6.5 million eggs. There are plans to harvest 2,200 tons of cereals, more than 5,000 tons of potatoes and over 300 tons of vegetables. The procurement of coarse and succulent feed is to be increased.

The sovkhoz collectives are confronted by great tasks during the current five-year plan as a whole. By the end of 1985, they should increase production by 1.5-fold in comparison with 1980 and produce 330 tons more meat than in 1980, 650 tons more milk and 2.2 million more eggs.

In response to the decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the collective of the Podlesnyy Military Sovkhoz has initiated a patriotic campaign.

It has assumed increased socialist obligations for 1982, as follows: to harvest at least 26 quintals of grain per hectare, 170 quintals of potatoes, 250 quintals of silage corn; to bring the milk yields per fodder cow up to 3,800 kg; to achieve an average daily weight increase for cattle of 800 g and pigs for fattening of 450 g; to prepare a full supply of coarse and succulent feed. This patriotic initiative of the Podlesnyy Sovkhoz has been approved by the district military council and has been extended to all our agricultural enterprises.

The work summed up for the first half of the current year make it possible that much has been done. As a whole for the sovkhozes, the gross meat output of all types was 2,538 quintals in dressed weight. This is 140 percent in relation to the half-year quota. Over the 6 months, 1,986 liters of milk have been produced per fodder cow or 104 percent of the quota. The plan quotas have also been successfully fulfilled for the remaining indicators.

When one must talk about the successes of the workers on the military sovkhozes, involuntarily one resorts to the dry language of figures. Incidentally, these figures are given a special content when one imagines the enormous labor of the production collectives and our remarkable persons behind them. They spare neither effort nor time to gain from the land all that it is capable of providing for industrious and thrifty farmers. We have many such persons with a generous soul and able hands as members of the field brigades and also in livestock raising.

We have challenged the sovkhoz collectives to equal the pacesetters in the socialist competition. Let me mention just a few names. On the Podlesnyy Sovkhoz these are the milkmaids A. A. Semykina and V. I. Bugorskaya who over the first half of the year milked 2,400 kg from each of the 40 fodder cows assigned them and this is 67 percent of the annual quota. On the Khimki Sovkhoz, the calf tender Z. A. Komarova who has been assigned 65 calves achieved an average daily weight increase of 820 g per head in the first 6 months with a quota of 497 g. On the same sovkhoz, 179 hogs have been assigned to the pig keeper A. I. Ul'yanova. She, due to constant and careful work, over the 6 months of the current year, has obtained an average daily weight increase of 640 g per head, having thereby fulfilled the annual quota by 128 percent.

In order to carry out the tasks confronting the sovkhozes, it has been considered advisable to specialize certain military sovkhozes. Thus, the Podlesnyy Military Sovkhoz is being specialized in the fattening of pigs and the raising of the early varieties of potato. There are plans to reconstruct the existing production buildings and build an additional pig barn for breeding sows. This will make it possible for the sovkhoz even during the current 5 years to double meat production.

The Novaya Lyada Sovkhoz has begun specializing in the raising of poultry. Here they plan to build a poultry farm for 50,000 layers with a complete cycle and thereby double egg production. In the next few years, an incubator, a chick house and a poultry house for 30,000 layers will be built.

The Seyma Military Sovkhoz is to be a farm for meat and dairy production and in the future it will be specialized in the production of meat and milk.

In light of the decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee there has been further development of sponsorship aid for the military sovkhozes from

the troop units. This is provided primarily by assigning personnel and motor transport during the most crucial work periods such as spring sowing, harvesting and the preparing of feed. That is, when it is essential to carry out a maximum amount of work in a short period of time and the collectives of the military sovkhozes are unable to do this with their own forces. Of course, this is not done to the detriment of the military and political training of our men.

To plant and harvest on time! This is the law of the grain grower. In the harvest period, as the folk saying goes, one day will feed a year, the sponsorship aid is indispensable. And this help is good. In our view, the practice of assigning certain troop collectives to the sovkhozes should be approved. In this instance closer and stronger ties are established between them.

Help is provided not only in carrying out seasonal work, but also in developing and strengthening the physical plant of the farms, including the building of farms, the repairing of hothouses, roads, silage pits and so forth.

In mobilizing the men to successfully carry out the planned, we should not forget the people themselves who are working at our agricultural enterprises, that they live in well built apartments and work in good production buildings equipped with modern facilities. It is essential to do everything so that our military agricultural enterprises be exemplary not only in terms of work indicators, but also in terms of services and amenities.

In recent years, a good deal has been done in this regard, although certainly not all. Certain sovkhozes still lack comfortable housing, cultural-service facilities and good roads. For this reason, we must further strengthen the physical plant in every possible way. At the same time, it is important to effectively utilize all the existing resources and to be constantly concerned that the allocated means, mineral fertilizers and equipment produce a maximum return. It would be wise to more profoundly analyze the economic condition of the enterprises and to study and actively introduce the experience of the pacesetters, progressive production methods and scientific organization of labor.

Equally important is the greatest possible support on the spot for the initiatives of the farmers. Their creative labor does not tolerate petty interference or bureaucratic rule. In the future, we must constantly increase the responsibility of the personnel for the unconditional fulfillment of the production plans, for the observance of labor discipline and for introducing all that is new and advanced into practice.

The further greatest possible development of the troop unit kitchen farms is another area for increasing the contribution of the district farms to carrying out the Food Program. And this is not only because, for example, in 1981, the kitchen farms produced 4-fold more meat than the military sovkhozes. It is also because precisely in this area we have most still-unused reserves for increasing the output of meat and other agricultural products.

Each troop formation, each troop unit, each troop facility and military school can have a kitchen farm. It must be pointed out that many of them do have such kitchen farms. They not only have them, but are endeavoring to strengthen and enlarge them so as to produce at least 15 kg of meat per man fed during the current year and the same quantity of greens.

In 1981, the kitchen farms produced more than 1,700 tons of meat and around 1,000 tons of vegetables and potatoes. There are troop units which even last year fulfilled the tasks set for this five-year plan and produced 15 and more kg of meat per man fed. These include the troop unit where Lt Col N. Marchenko is the deputy commander for the rear and the Tula Higher Artillery Engineer School imeni Tul'skiy Proletariat.

In the development of the kitchen farms we have established a basic policy of creating livestock complexes in the large garrisons and troop units. Definite experience has already been acquired here. For example, in 1980, in the troop unit where the rear services are headed by Lt Col M. Boyko, the first such livestock complex has been built. Over the 2½ years the complex has proven to be a very profitable enterprise. Each year, it produces 70 tons of meat, 75 tons of milk, 250,000 eggs and 15 tons of greens. All of this is a weighty contribution.

More advanced complexes will be completed this year on the farms of the Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin and the Guards Kantemirov Tank Division. As a total over the five-year plan, we intend to build 6 such complexes, 150 pig barns and a number of other projects. Of course, additional capital investments are also needed.

If one were to speak about the long run up to 1990, our kitchen farms should increase meat production up to 15 kg per person fed. The task, of course, is not a simple one. In order to carry it out, it is essential to feed a significantly larger number of pigs than we presently do. For fattening such a number of pigs, in addition to the waste food, we must produce more than a million tons of various feed. In other words, the troop units should have their own truck gardens which would produce not only vegetables and greens for the soldier's mess, but also feed crops. The development of the kitchen gardens has been started at a higher pace. Even this year, many troop units have kitchen gardens with an area of 75 hectares and more. As a total, more than 1,100 hectares have been planted under gardens. Some 250 hectares of cereals and 400 hectares of various grasses have been planted. Potatoes and beets have been planted on 550 hectares. There are plans to harvest 1,200 tons of hay. There is reason to assume that we will succeed in carrying out all that we have planned.

I would also like to mention the following. Poultry can and must be kept at the integrated kitchen farms which are being organized. This is an advantageous matter. Meat and eggs are available to feed the troops. But again it is a question of feed. Special feed is needed for poultry and the farms of the troop units are not able to produce this. For this reason it is essential to settle the question of centralized supply of poultry feed for the farms of the troop units.

Problems related to the construction and completion of the livestock complexes have arisen and are arising. There was a time when small kitchen farms were kept in the troop units and under those conditions the commanders, in carrying out the tasks of running the kitchen farms, got by using their own internal abilities. Now the scope and scale of the farms are quite different. The complexes are no longer primitive pig sties which previously existed in the troop farms. These are an entire series of large production buildings with complex utilities. These cannot be created without effective aid from the specialists of the barracks services unit. But they, unfortunately, as yet have not become involved in the kitchen farms and do not have the appropriate instructions for this. Thus it happens that the complexes exist somewhat "outside

the law," at times having neither water, heat nor electric power. For this reason the time has come to legitimize the existence of such complexes. Possibly it makes sense to work out and pass a special regulation. For example, similar to the "Regulation Governing Soldier Tearooms." And this is disregarding also the issue that the construction of the livestock complexes must often be carried out without good standard plans, without proper supply of building materials and engineer-technical supervision.

Obviously, it is also essential to revise the price for meat produced on the kitchen farms and delivered for planned troop supplies. In our view, the price should be raised to the level of the general state procurements. This will increase the incentive of the corresponding officials to increase meat production.

It is essential to develop not only the kitchen farms, but also the subsidiary ones. The task is that each enterprise and organization capable of running a subsidiary farm should to a maximum degree meet the demand for meat, milk, vegetables and potatoes for employee meals. By the end of 1985, each self-financing enterprise should have its own subsidiary farm.

Above the question was raised of increasing the production of agricultural products by the military sovkhozes, the kitchen and subsidiary farms. But for all of us the safekeeping and rational use of the products allocated to feed the personnel are a question of enormous state significance. In a majority of the district units, this task is successfully carried out. Much is being done for the thrifty and rational use of bread. The junior food service specialists and a predominant majority of the men in the district do not waste bread. In the soldier messes, it is cut into small pieces and brought to the table so as to exclude large amounts left over.

While the concern for saving bread does exist in our troops, this cannot be said about certain other types of food products. Unfortunately, in individual troop units there still are instances of the loss and theft of meat products, butter and other goods. Of course, the guilty parties are strictly punished. However, the task is to completely eliminate these unworthy phenomena and to ensure the complete keeping of each gram of food.

Not only the internal inspection commissions, but also the people's control bodies, must be more widely involved in the active struggle to keep and rationally utilize food products. It is essential to strengthen control over the nutritional quality of the food for the personnel and over the food supply for the units. This must be carried out by the commanders and superiors of all levels who, incidentally, should do this according to the regulations.

Here a great deal can be done also by our propagandists, agitators and party and Komsomol activists. In explaining the provisions of the Food Program and the ways to fulfill it, each of them has an opportunity to turn directly to the life of one or another troop collective. Here they can point out what attitude the men have to public property, how they save on large and small matters and what personal contribution they are making to adding to the motherland's might.

We are endeavoring to closely link all the organizational and political work related to carrying out the decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to the tasks of the district personnel and to the successful carrying out of the military and political training plans and the socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. In constantly emphasizing the concern of our Leninist party for the good of the people, we are urging the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and officers to even better carry out their responsible duty of defendintg the motherland and to more securely protect the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people, the builders of communism.

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